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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
Natural disasters can trigger chemical accidents resulting in fire, explosion or release of 
hazardous materials. Such joint events were first defined as ‘Natech’ accidents by Showalter and 
Myers1) when they reviewed the causes of chemical accidents triggered by natural hazard events. 
Natural hazard triggers such as earthquake2); hurricane3); flood, lightening4); and tsunami5) were 
documented in previous studies. All over the globe Natech accidents have occurred in the wake of 
natural hazards and disasters and have resulted in the release of hazardous substances leading to 
fatalities, injuries, environmental pollution and economic losses6). In Europe, the issue of Natech is 
now considered as an emerging risk7). Natechs have resulted in a small number of accidents with 
human impacts relative to other types of chemical accidents in the United States8). Nevertheless, 
climate change and increased population in areas subject to high risk from natural hazards may result 
in greater human impacts from Natechs in the future. 
 
The Natech events may cause harm to population either directly or indirectly7). Direct effects 
may include fire, spread of toxic clouds or toxic fumes, environmental pollution, and other events 
difficult to control after the strike of a natural disaster. In an indirect manner, protecting people under 
the risk of Natech accident may be hindered or delayed due to the impact of natural triggers. For 
example, roadways may be impassible to response vehicles, the natural disaster such as earthquake, 
flooding may prevent responders from reaching the Natech victims. Moreover, response personal 
and equipment may be called to the natural disaster caused catastrophe, especially search and rescue 
operations9).   
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When a Natech accident occurs, even the areas that are not struck by the natural disaster can be 
affected by the spread of released hazardous materials such as toxic gas or flammable liquid. 
Furthermore, the fire, explosion and/or toxic releases resulting from the Natech accident may expand 
their influencing scope at any time if the Natech cannot be controlled in an effective and timely 
manner. This is highly possible because the emergency resources can be occupied or consumed by 
the natural disaster in a short time. Thus, large number of residents in a relatively large area may 
need to take protective actions (e.g., evacuation, shelter in place). However, in the context of a 
Natech, people have to face at least two hazards within a limited time. Take the Natech accident that 
occurred during the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (GEJET) as an example; many 
residents living near an affected industrial area in Sendai evacuated for the earthquake and/or 
tsunami initially. Then following the occurrence of a Natech accident at a nearby refinery five hours 
later, residents were confronted with the decision to evacuate again or not based on their own risk 
perceptions of the threat posed by the huge fires and smoke coming from the accident.  
 
In addition to deciding whether to evacuate or not, residents must consider the logistics of 
evacuation which refers to the activities and associated resources needed to reach a safe location and 
remain there until it is safe to return10). That is they must decide when to evacuate, what mode of 
transportation to use and where they will go. With such information, local officials can develop 
efficient plans to protect residents under the risk of Natech accidents. For example, with the data on 
evacuees’ departure timing, emergency managers can develop a dynamic and flexible plan to 
mobilize emergency resources such as police, rescue team or medical team according to resident’s 
departure time distribution. Transportation officers need the data on transportation mode use so they 
can forecast the traffic conditions and take measures to ease traffic jams. The data on evacuees’ 
shelter behavior is also important for local officials to estimate how many households will need 
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accommodations in local officially designated shelters. 
 
Moreover, managing evacuee’ reentry to their communities following the end of an evacuation 
is also a significant challenge that emergency management officials face in the aftermath of 
disasters11). In some aspects, reentry is more problematic than evacuation because evacuees might be 
scattered over thousands of square kilometers in multiple cities12). Another challenge is to prevent 
evacuees returning home before their living areas are safe to stay. After the passage of hazardous 
conditions, evacuees often desire to return to their homes as soon as possible to determine the 
condition of and extent of damage to property; protect and secure property that may have been 
damaged or vulnerable for looting, etc13). However, evacuees who return too early could frustrate 
local officials’ efforts to maintain security in the evacuation zone11). Moreover, early reenters can be 
in danger from lingering conditions of the original Natech hazard, especially the invisible hazards 
that cannot be detected immediately and directly. In practice, however, many evacuees leave shelters 
as soon as it appears that reentry routes are open and typically well before the “evacuation ending” 
advisories are issued13). Consequently, research is needed to gain a better understanding of the 
factors that influence evacuee’s reentry timing; especially the factors motivate them to return before 
the termination of the evacuation.  
1.2 Research Objectives 
The purpose of this dissertation is to gain understanding pertaining to household protective 
actions before during and after evacuating for the Natech accident. Using the data collected from a 
random household survey following a Natech accident which occurred during the GEJET on March 
11, 2011, the overall goal will be addressed through three research objectives and each of them has 
several specific research questions. 
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 Objective 1: Examining household risk perception and behavioral responses to a Natech accident 
Research questions:  
1) How did resident’s risk perception change throughout the multiple Natech related evacuations?  
2) What protective actions did residents take in response to the Natech? 
3) What differences are there in risk perceptions and protective behavior according to resident’s 
location? 
4) Which groups had higher risk perception levels and were more likely to adopt protective 
measures. 
 Objective 2: Analyzing the logistics of household evacuation during the Natech accident 
Research questions:  
1) When, how and where did households evacuate for the Natech accident? 
2) What differences are there in departure timing, transportation mode use and shelter choice 
according to household’s age and location? 
3) Did household risk perception, location and demographic factors play roles in the lag time 
between the moment that Natech risk was perceived and the actual evacuation (mobilization 
time)?  
4) Did household risk perception, location, demographic factors, and evacuation message play 
roles in the lag time between the moment the Natech evacuation order was received and the 
actual evacuation (mobilization time)?  
 Objective 3: Understanding household reentry timing after evacuating for the Natech accident 
Research questions:  
1) What differences were there in reentry timing according to household’s location? 
2) How did household’s risk perception influence their reentry timing? 
3) Were there any differences between the older and younger groups in reentry timing?  
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1.3 Organization of the dissertation  
This dissertation consists of eight chapters. Chapter 1 provides the general backgrounds of this 
study, and introduces the research objectives guided by sets of questions. The following chapter 
provides a review of the relevant literature, detailing the identified influential factors concerning 
behavioral response to the disaster, evacuation logistics and reentry behavior. The third chapter 
describes the methodology used to conduct this study, including the description of the study area, 
data collection, sample characteristics, and the statistical techniques for data analysis. Chapter 4, 5 
and 6 present the results in response to the thee objectives proposed in Chapter 1. Chapter 7 
discusses the major findings, and Chapter 8 draws the conclusions of this dissertation.  
 
Fig 1.1 Structure of the dissertation
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 2: Literature             
Review 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
Chapter 7: Discussion 
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
Chapter 4: Objective 1 
Behavioral Response 
Chapter 5: Objective 2 
Evacuation Logistics 
Chapter 6: Objective 3 
Reentry Timing 
Results 
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Chapter 2  
 
Literature Review 
                                     
This chapter provides a review of the previous literature related to household protective actions. 
The first section of this chapter provides an overview of factors that influence household behavioral 
response to the disasters. The factors include risk perception, evacuation warning, geographic and 
demographic characteristics. The second section reviews the current research and findings pertaining 
to the evacuation logistics including departure time, transportation use and the option of evacuation 
shelters. The final section of this chapter presents the former studies concerning evacuee’s reentry 
behavior, especially the findings pertaining to the reentry timing.  
2.1 Behavioral Response: Factors and Influence 
Past research on household behavioral response to disasters such as earthquake1), flood2), 
hurricane3), volcano4), and hazardous materials incidents5) has identified many activities in which 
people engaged in responding to the threats. The most common discussed protective action was 
evacuation. Besides, Lindell and Perry5) documented emergency actions other than evacuation 
including normal routine activities, actively seek (or passive wait) additional information, prepare 
for protective actions, and protect property. However, people’s choices of response actions can be 
frustrated by situational inhibitors (e.g., the lack of a reliable vehicle in which to evacuate) or 
enhanced by situational facilitators (e.g., the availability of neighbors who have room in their cars) 
that arise from their physical, social, and household contexts 6). Therefore, examining the influential 
factors can help us to advance understanding of household behavioral response to different threats. 
The following sections present the identified factors in previous studies. It has to be noted that none 
of them has been discussed in the contexts of Natech accident. Thus, it will be interesting to examine 
their roles in households’ response to the Natech threats.  
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2.1.1 Risk perception 
Risk perception is the subjective assessment of the probability of a specified type of accident 
happening and how concerned we are with the consequences. To perceive risk includes evaluations 
of the probability as well as the consequences of a negative outcome7). Risk perception appears to 
hold a central position in the political agenda of many countries and is crucial for the understanding 
of involvement in the environment and oppositions to technology8). Although the risk perception 
research begun from the nuclear debate of the 60s by psychologists8), hazard researchers in other 
disciplines have contributed to this area. In the geographical vernacular, for example, instead of 
dwelling on the cognitive process, geographers focus more on the response9). In particular, 
geographers by studying hazard perception seek to understand why people take actions to response 
to environmental threats and how they form their perceptions of the range of the actions available to 
them9). In behavioral sciences, the concern is more about how to measure the risk perception. The 
approach is asking the public what level of safety is acceptable for a wide range of technologies or 
activities9). For example, Perry and Lindell4) measured residents’ property/personal safety risk 
perception to the volcano using the statement: My property/personal safety will be significantly 
threatened by a volcanic eruption in the next 5 years (1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree). 
Siebeneck et al 10) measured evacuees’ reentry decision making by asking them to rate on a scale of 1 
(not at all) to 5 (=very great extent) on how dangerous they perceived the conditions at their home 
were at the time they decided to return home.  
 
Risk perception has been found to be a key factor in evacuation behavior. Knowledge about 
hazards alone is not enough to motivate actions. Instead, information must be translated into a 
concrete conception of pending danger11). Riad et al12) studied the phenomenon of why people 
sometimes decide not to evacuate from a dangerous situation based on the data collected from 
hurricanes Hugo and Andrew. They found that not perceiving the hurricane as a threat and believing 
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one’s home was the safe place were the most common reasons for not evacuating. Besides 
evacuation decision-making, the relationship between risk perception and other protective actions 
such as hazard adjustment1 adoption have been discussed in former studies. Terpstra and Lindell14) 
found that risk perception is significantly correlated with the intention to adopt flood hazard 
adjustments. However, for the seismic hazards, Lindell and Whitney1) argued that risk perception is 
not significantly correlated with either adoption intentions or actual adoption. Moreover, in a recent 
review paper, flood risk perceptions were found to be rather weak predictors of flood hazard 
adjustments 15). The inconsistent results raise the interest to examine the role risk perception plays in 
affecting people’s protective actions against Natechs.  
 
In addition to examine the relationship between risk perception and evacuation decision making, 
some studies begun to explore the factors that may influence risk perception. Residents’ locations 
and demographic characteristics were discussed most. Relationships between proximity to hazards 
and risk perception were discussed for hurricane 16) flood17), earthquake18) and hazards resulting from 
hazardous industrial facilities19). They all concluded that higher risk perception is inversely 
associated with distance to the hazards. Furthermore, Stern et al20) found that being female is 
associated with higher risk perception levels than being male. The authors explain that women are 
more aware than men of the consequences of events; therefore more likely to develop beliefs about 
the consequences. In addition, Huang et al21) found that being older correlated to lower risk 
perception for hurricanes, because older people tend to expect less personal impact. However, age 
was reported positively correlated with risk perception of coastal flood risks22).  
2.1.2 Evacuation warning 
Evacuation is rarely an individual process. Even in single-person households, the first response 
to the initial evacuation warning is to seek further information on the validity of the threat or to 
                                                   
1 Hazard adjustment refers to emergency management interventions to reduce disaster impacts. It 
includes hazard mitigation, and emergency and recovery preparedness13)  
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consult with friends, co-worker, neighbor, family member, or relative23). Therefore, studies on 
warning often focus on to varying degrees on warning as a social process, rater than a simple result 
of hearing official warnings11). Social scientists have identified general and specific factors that 
affect the warning response which include sender and receiver factors, situational factors, and social 
contact 23). Table 2-1 lists the factors summarized by Sorensen 24).  
Table 2-1 Major factors covarying with evacuation compliance 
Factor 
Response due to 
factor increase  
Level of empirical 
support 
Physical cues Increases High 
Social cues Increases High 
Perceived risk Increases Moderate 
Knowledge of hazard Increases High 
Experience with hazard Mixed High 
Education Increases High 
Family planning Increases Low 
Fatalistic beliefs Decreases Low 
Resource level Increases Moderate 
Family united Increases High  
Family size Increases Moderate 
Kin relations (number) Increases High 
Community involvement Increases High 
Age Mixed High 
Socioeconomic status Increases High 
Being female versus male Increases Moderate 
Having children Increases Moderate 
Channel: electronic Mixed Low 
Media Mixed Low 
Siren Decreases Low 
Personal warning Versus impersonal Increases High 
Proximity to threat Increases Low 
Message specificity Increases High 
Number of channels Increases Low 
Frequency Increases High 
Message consistency Increases High 
Message certainty Increases High 
Source credibility Decreases  High 
Fear of looting Decreases Moderate 
Time to impact Decreases Moderate 
Source familiarity Increases High 
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The key role of warnings in motivating people to evacuate is to help them to perceive the risk. 
Thus, the information from the warning should lead people to believe the danger to be real, 
understand the event as needing special attention, and define the danger as something they must 
personally do something about, such as evacuating a particular area25). To do so, the warning 
message should from the credible and reliable sources; convey consistent information provided by 
other sources; provide accurate information about the risk; be worded in simple language; convey a 
high level of certainty; contain sufficient information; provide guidance about what to do; repeat 
frequently; be delivered with multiple channel; and clearly specify the location of the danger25). 
Lindell and Perry26) found that as the specificity of the message content increases, so does the 
likelihood of evacuation. They also found that more specific message produce higher levels of 
warning belief and higher perceived personal risk. 
 
The other group of studies has focused on analyzing the characteristics of receivers. As 
presented in Table 2-1, the effect of experience with hazard was mixed. Personal experience affects 
very general beliefs about hazards, but it does not necessarily determine people’s situational 
assessments. Thus, experience can produce erroneous conclusions that sometimes enhance disaster 
response but other times detract from it26). Furthermore, Lindell and Perry5) reported a U-shaped 
relationship between age and the likelihood of warning response after analyzing data from four 
communities. The highest evacuation rates are among those older than 60 year and those younger 
than 30 years. Those people in the middle age groups (31-44 years and 45-59 years) had 
significantly lower probabilities of evacuation and were more likely to undertake some protective 
action short of evacuation. Moreover, Fothergill27) found that women are more likely to receive, 
believe, and personalize disaster warnings than men and likely to respond with protective actions, 
particularly evacuation. Women are more likely than men to perceive a disaster threat as risky and 
serious, especially if it will affect their families. Women may be more likely to prepare their families 
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and to be involved in local preparedness groups. Other factors such as education and income were 
found to be unrelated to warning response26).  
2.1.3 Geographic locations 
Cutter and Barnes28) examined the evacuation behavior of residents during the Three Mile 
Island nuclear power accident and found that proximity to hazard related to evacuation. Those 
residents who lived closer to the plant were more likely to undertake an evacuation than those living 
further away, regardless of occupational or educational levels. Similarly, Lindell et al29) found that 
geographic characteristics such as proximity to the coast, rivers or lakes were more likely to 
evacuate during a Hurricane. However, they also indicated that those in high-risk areas receive more 
attention from authorities and are more likely to receive passive information from the local 
authorities and media.  
  
Baker3) discussed residents’ evacuation behavior with various elevations above the sea. He 
found that evacuation from high-risk areas (Barrier Island or open coastlines with elevations less 
than 10 feet above mean sea level) is usually very good. However moderate-risk areas (on the 
protected mainland but no more than 10 to 15 feet high) and low-risk sites (on the relatively 
protected mainland, over 15 or 20 feet in elevation) deserve more attention from officials. 
Moderate-risk areas are sometimes subject to inundation by storm surge, but the evacuate rate is 
usually between 55 and 65 percent. Evacuation shadow may appear in low-risk areas, which refers to 
the evacuation that does not necessarily need evacuation. This may contribute to the traffic 
congestion and increase the time necessary to clear evacuees from high-risk and moderate-risk areas. 
 
Zelinsky and Kosinski30) indicated that evacuees tended to move in whatever directions are 
believed to minimize or cancel the effects of the disaster. Thus, if the physical impact of the disaster 
is directional in nature, for example, a flooding stream, or wind-driven clouds of lethal substances, 
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the resulting dispersion of residents will be directionally skewed, with maximum numbers moving in 
the direction deemed safest.                                                                                                  
2.1.4 Demographic factors  
The importance of demographic factors were discussed in many studies, however, the results 
were conflicting. For example, Baker3) pointed out that demographic factors including age, previous 
hurricane experience, previous unnecessary evacuation, general hurricane awareness, education, sex, 
and family status are rarely, weakly, inconsistently, or never related to evacuation. Later research 
confirmed or denied his findings.  
 
Several studies have found that women were more likely to evacuate for Hurricanes21)29)31) and 
they were also more likely to respond to earthquake aftershocks32) and hurricane warnings31). For the 
reasons, Bateman and Edwards31) indicated that socially constructed gender differences in 
care-giving roles, access to evacuation incentives, and exposure to risk and perceived risk, leading 
more women to evacuate than men for the Hurricane. They also pointed out that women are more 
likely than men to be single parents and to have children in the household, and they were more likely 
to be caring for someone with special needs. The reason that women can perceive higher risk than 
men was explained by Stern et al20). The authors explained that women are more aware than men of 
the consequences of events; therefore more likely to develop beliefs about the consequences. 
However, this explanation was not fully testified according to the study by Huang et al21), by 
analyzing data from Hurricane Ike using correlation and regression analysis. They found that female 
gender did not have a significant regression coefficient in the prediction of perceived storm 
characteristics, but did have a significant correlation between them. In addition, a recent flood 
evacuation survey of three communities in Hat Yai, Thailand, found that men were more likely to 
evacuate than women2). As demonstrated, most demographic variables (other than gender) have 
weak and inconsistent correlations with risk perceptions, protective action perceptions, and 
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protective responses.  
 
Age has been talked in many studies; however, the findings were inconsistent. For example, 
Lzao et al33) found that older respondents were more likely to evacuate than other respondents. 
Especially, older respondents, those with higher education levels, and those employed full time were 
more likely to evacuate than their counterparts. However, Cutter and Barnes28) found that during the 
Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident, the evacuation rate decreased with age. Forty-five 
percent of the respondents aged 20-49 evacuated, while only 14% of those over age 50 left the area. 
Moreover, Luathep et al2) also found that older people prefer not to evacuate during the flood.  
 
Other demographic factors were summarized by Dash and Gladwin11) when they reviewed the 
literature on evacuation decision-making and behavioral responses. They stated that the presence of 
children in the house can either motivate or constrain evacuation. With children in the house might 
influence parents to protect them from danger, yet the lack of resources to evacuate may hinder the 
ability to take protective measures. They also indicated that household size and residence in a 
single-family dwelling are strong predictors of evacuation, regardless of a household’s location. 
However, household size was found to have a negative, but not significant, correlation with 
evacuation from hurricanes in Florida by Solis et al34).  
2.2 Evacuation logistics: Factors and Influence 
Evacuation logistics was defined as the activities and associated resources needed to research a 
safe location and remain there until it is safe to return35). Lindell et al35) stated that in addition to 
deciding whether to evacuate, potential evacuees must also consider when, where and how to 
evacuate. However, there is substantially less research on these issues than on evacuation decision 
making, and none has been done to understand the logistics during the Natech evacuation. Currently, 
research on evacuation logistics includes departure time, vehicle usage, destination choice, 
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evacuation route, duration and cost, etc36).  
2.2.1 Departure time 
Lindell et al 29) found that in response to Hurricane Lili, the proportion of evacuations was 
greatest just after daylight and decreased steadily throughout the day. They also reported that the 
desire to complete an evacuation during daylight hours appears to be more important than a desire 
for authoritative recommendations from technical experts. Huang et al21) confirmed this finding by 
reporting 80% of households left home in daytime hours during Hurricane Ike. According to their 
explanation, the best way to avoid having to drive after dark, or, more likely, to be searching fruitless 
for a hotel room after dark, is to leave early in the day. Hansan et al37) explored the distribution of 
departure times before Hurricane Ivan landfall. They found that the number of departures was not 
high at the beginning of the evacuation; with the passage of time the departure rate increases 
significantly; however, at hours very close to the landfall time the number of departures become very 
low.  
 
Several factors have been studied to help to explain the departure time. Lindell et al35) found 
that older residents left earlier but larger households and those located farther from the coast tended 
to evacuate late during Hurricane Lili. Using the date of Hurricane Katrina and Rita, Wu et al36) 
confirmed the finding of Lindell et al35) by concluding that those who are further inland tend to enter 
the evacuation route later than those who are closer to the coast. However, age was not found to be a 
significant factor. Furthermore, Hasan et al37) found that evacuation departure time depends on the 
type and location of the destination. Households evacuating to public shelter are more likely to 
evacuate later compared to the households moving to other types of shelters. They explained this 
phenomenon as evacuees may prefer to take the risk of staying longer at home than going to the 
public shelter. The other explanation they gave was that households that evacuate late are more 
likely to choose public shelter as their destinations as there are less time available to go to other 
16 
 
types of places such as friend’s or relative’s house and hotels.  
 
Another topic concerning the timing behavior of household evacuation is the “mobilization 
time”. Sorensen38) first statistically examined individual variation in the timing of warning receipt 
and evacuation departure during an evacuation from hazardous materials fire using path analysis, 
and he defined this time gap as ‘mobilization time’. He found that the only significant variable 
related to mobilization time is the personalization of the warning source (warning from friends or 
relatives yielded least mobilization time). The other factors such as age and family size were found 
to be not related to either time of warning receipt or mobilization time. He also found that people at 
greater distance to the site of the emergency mobilized as quickly as those close in. Furthermore, 
level of perceived threat did not lead to faster response. Hasan et al37) developed a random parameter 
ordered probit model to explain the lag time between the evacuation decision and actual evacuation. 
They found that older people (over 50 years old) took less time to prepare during the Hurricane 
evacuation. They also explained this phenomenon as older people might feel concerned about the 
threat created by the hurricane and evacuate as early as possible before the hurricane makes its 
landfall. Another interesting finding is that evacuees who went to a public shelter are more likely to 
depart within an hour and take least amount time to prepare for the evacuation.  
2.2.2 Transportation mode and destination choice 
Murray-Tuite and Wolshon39) presented a detailed review of the existing literature related to the 
choice of transportation mode during evacuation. They indicated that the mode of transportation 
taken to evacuate is likely to depend on a number of factors, such as characteristics of the disaster; 
required travel distance to reach safety; location of the evacuees at the time an order is given; and 
available options. Furthermore, according to the study by Lindell et al35), evacuees’ choice of 
transportation was related with age, household size, and education. Specifically, older females were 
less likely, whereas married homeowners with larger household sizes, as well as higher education 
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and incomes were more likely to take their own cars. Moreover, younger evacuees who were married 
and had larger households with children and higher incomes tended to take more vehicles. Wu et al36) 
found that the most common way for households to evacuate is to take their own vehicles no matter 
where they are or when they leave during Hurricane Katrina and Rita. Sadri et al40) presented and 
explained a behavior model to capture the mode choice decisions of evacuees who are most likely to 
using non-household transportation modes during a Hurricane. They found that single evacuees are 
less likely to ride a taxi; the more the number of people over 65 years living in the household, the 
more likely to ride with someone from another household; evacuees evacuating to a shelter are less 
likely to ride with someone from another household; those evacuating to a home of friend or relative 
are less likely to use special evacuation bus.  
 
The choice of evacuation destination can be influenced by many factors. For example, Mileti, et 
al41) found that socioeconomic status and age of evacuees determine the use of overnight shelters. 
Specifically, people who lack financial resources and the aged are the ones most likely to seek 
shelters in public evacuation shelter. They also indicated other factors such as type of hazard, urban 
versus rural, day versus night and shelter availability publicity, but their influences on shelter choice 
needs further study. Moreover, Mitchell et al42) reported the reasons why only 6 percent used the 
public shelters during a chlorine spill accident: 1. Other family members offered to take them in; 2. 
They were dislike for shelters; 3. They were not told about shelters; 4. Pets not allowed; 5. They did 
not know the location or could not find it, etc. In addition, according to the findings of Lindell et al34), 
those with higher income and home owners were less likely to use public shelters during the 
Hurricane evacuation. Wu et al36) found that those with larger households and children were less 
likely to stay with friends/relatives; whereas younger, married evacuees with larger households and 
children, and those with higher incomes were more likely to stay in hotels/motels.  
 
18 
 
2.3 Reentry: Factors and Influence 
Return-entry (reentry) is the movement of an evacuated population back to an area following 
the issuance of an all-clear message which indicates the end of evacuation43). Comparing to the 
evacuation, the studies in respect to returnees’ behavior during the reentry process are very limited. 
This may because gathering information regarding reentry is a challenging endeavor. Siebeneck and 
Cova43) pointed out that one challenge is to collect a large enough number of useable data. As the 
authors noted unlike evacuation studies in which surveys are mailed out to residences in 
disaster-stricken areas and the researcher is able to determine who evacuated and who did not, 
reentry analyses can only be conducted by using survey in which the respondents evacuated from the 
disaster. For such limitation, they suggested that conducting reentry studies simultaneously with 
evacuation studies may increase the usable response rate and make reentry research less costly to 
researchers. Furthermore, authors noted that another challenge is the timing of conducting the 
surveys. In the areas that have sustained significant disaster damage, gathering information about the 
return may be delayed until residents have been able to return to their homes.  
 
Stallings44) published the only paper entirely dedicated to reentry as a research topic and noted 
that ending evacuations can be a complicated process, and we need to know about it. Moreover, the 
author stated that ending the evacuations triggered by chemical or radioactive agents are more 
problematic than the cases occasioned by natural disasters. This is because there is likely to be 
conflict between evacuees and the public officials responsible for the evacuation and its termination 
as well as conflict among evacuees themselves.  
 
Siebeneck and Cova43) assessed the reentry process for Hurricane Rita, and found that over half 
of the surveyed households violated the reentry order by returning prior to scheduled return date. 
Furthermore, a relationship was found between distance evacuated and reentry date, in that the 
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farther a household evacuates, the more likely it will return at a later date. Moreover, women and 
individuals with lower education levels were found to be more likely to comply with the reentry 
orders. However, age, marital status, number of people per household, household with children, 
number of children, income level, home ownership status, and home type were not found to 
correlated with reentry orders significantly.  
 
Siebeneck and Cova17) explored the influence of risk perception on reentry plans compliance 
using the data gathered from the 2008 Cedar Rapids, Iowa Flood. They found that returnees who 
complied with return orders reported a higher risk perception when making the decision to return 
than those did not comply. Siebeneck et al45) examined evacuees’ reentry concerns and experiences 
in the aftermath of Hurricane Ike. They found that demographic variables such as age, gender, 
household size, etc, were not significantly correlated with the compliance of official reentry plans. 
Moreover, they found that concerns about reentry traffic predicted earlier reentry and concern about 
the physical risk was related to reentry plan compliance.  
2.4 Summary  
In summary, a number of studies have addressed the issues concerning evacuation decision 
making, evacuation logistics and reentry behavior for natural events (especially for hurricane and 
flood). However, little research has been conducted on the chemical accident evacuation and reentry, 
and none of them concerned about household protective behavior in face of the conjoint Natech 
accident. The present study seeks to fill this gap in our knowledge by analyzing the data collected 
from a random household survey for a Natech accident. The next chapter provides an overview of 
the method by which this study aims to achieve this understanding.
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Chapter 3 
 
Methodology 
 
This chapter presents the methodology used to conduct this study. The first section gives a brief 
description of the case study background. This section is followed by the method of collecting data. 
The next two sections provide information about the response data characteristics as well as the 
descriptive statistics of Natech evacuation data, respectively. The final section introduces the 
statistical techniques used for data analysis.  
3.1 Event description  
At 14:46 (Japan local time) on March 11, 2011, the most powerful earthquake in Japanese 
history and its triggered tsunami struck off the northeast Japan. This disaster is named as ‘2011 off 
the Pacific Coast of Tohoku Earthquake’ or ‘Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (GEJET)’1). 
This is the most powerful earthquake in the history of Japan1) and the fourth highest ever recorded in 
the world2). The earthquake triggered a tsunami with run up heights in excess of 39m, which resulted 
in 15,889 people dead and 2,594 missing3). According to the report by the Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism of Japan4), about 535km2 of coastal areas were inundated 
totally or partially destroying 220,000 buildings. In the Sendai plain, the most populous area in 
Tohoku area, the maximum inundation height reached up to 19.5 m, and the mean inundation height 
near the shoreline was about 10 m5).  
 
The earthquake and tsunami struck the industry park within the port of Sendai and 
triggered series of Natech accidents. The largest refinery in Japan locating in the industry park was 
severely damaged. Nishi6) reported that 1,404 hazmat facilities were damaged by the strong ground 
motion and 1,807 hazmat facilities were damaged by the Tsunami. The major Natech accident 
resulted in severe consequence on nearby residents. The first evacuation warning was given just 
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minutes after the main earthquake shock. About five hours later, the Natech accident forced the local 
officials to order an evacuation of residents in a 2 km radius around the refinery7) which included 
several tsunami evacuation shelters. 
 
The Sendai refinery is large, occupying 1.5 km2, and is physically located across three different 
jurisdictions: Tagajo city, Shichigahama town, and Sendai city. The location and layout of the 
refinery is presented in Fig 3.1. At 9:25 pm on the day of the earthquake, fires broke out at the west 
part of the refinery at the industrial park in Sendai7). The fires occurred at a refinery’s asphalt tanks, 
a gasoline tank, molten sulfur tanks and the shipping yard6). The cause of fires were still unknown, 
but Zama et al8) believed that the floating oil spill was ignited due to a spark caused by the collision 
between tank lorries and oil handling facilities during the tsunami.  
 
 
Fig 3.1 Location and layout of Sendai refinery (Base map7)) 
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On March 11, 2011, 15 mins after receiving the big tsunami warning, refinery staff began to 
walk to a primary school (evacuation shelter) located in Shichigahama town about 2km away. The 
black smoke from the refinery was first observed at 5:10 pm9). However, the big fire started at 9:25 
pm, March 11 was the primary reason that forced local authorities to evacuate the residents nearby. 
The fire was so big that personal from the refinery requested the authorities in Shichigahama town to 
evacuate residents immediately. Shichigahama town officially issued the Natech evacuation order at 
9:25am, March 12. Due to loss of communication systems, Tagajo city and Sendai city were 
informed later, and they issued evacuation orders at 10:16am on March 12 and at 7:30am on March 
13, respectively. The fire was extinguished at 2:30 pm on March 157), and the evacuation orders were 
canceled at the same time 10)11). The time line is presented in Table 3-1.  
 
Table 3-1 Event time line 9)10)11) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Data collection 
In this study, data collection involved two field person-to-person surveys and one mail survey 
in order to understand residents’ attitude and protective actions such as evacuation due to the Natech 
Date Time Event 
3.11 02:46 pm Earthquake 
 03:15 pm Big tsunami warning 
 03:30 pm Refinery staffs begun to evacuate to the shelter 
at Shichigahama town 
 03:50 pm Tsunami arrived 
 05:10pm Observed black smoke from the refinery 
 09:25 pm Big Fire broke out 
 09:30 pm Refinery staffs requested Shichigahama town 
to evacuate residents  
3.12 9:25 am Shichigahama town issued evacuation order 
 10:26 am Tagajo city issued evacuation order 
3.13 07:30 am Sendai city issued evacuation order 
3.15 02:30 pm Fire extinguished  
3.15 03:00 pm Evacuation order cancelled 
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accidents. We were also interested in collecting information concerning damages caused by the 
Natech and the evacuation order issuing process. The first person-to-person survey was conducted 
on November 10, 2013. Thirteen residents living within 3km of the affected refinery were randomly 
selected and interviewed. The second person-to-person survey, supported by the ResTO-TerRiN 
Project2, was carried out from March 17-20, 2014. During the investigation, we interviewed the 
personnel at the refinery and disaster management officers who experienced or were in charge of 
investigating the Natech accidents triggered by the GEJET. 
 
A household survey questionnaire was designed and developed in order to study protective 
actions for the Natech, taking into consideration the research questions, the past literature, and the 
person-to-person interviews. We used the Zenrin Co., Ltd detailed address database12) as a sampling 
frame. A random sample of households living within an area of 2.5km from the hazard source were 
taken.  
Based on our interviews with refinery officials, the primary hazard source was a liquefied 
petroleum gas (LPG) tank located nearest to the fire site. Although the fires did not start at the LPG 
tank farm, these represented the main threat to residents if the fire spread causing their explosion. 
Respondents were selected from households at increments of 0.5km from 1km to 2.5km from the 
nearest LPG tank to the residential area. A disproportionate stratified sampling technique was 
utilized and 400 respondents were sampled from each area for a total number of 1,732 samples. 
About one month later, a second mailing was carried out to undelivered questionnaires after 
addresses were checked. A total of 1,632 questionnaires involving 20 communities (see Fig 3.3) 
were effectively delivered and 484 households responded, for a response rate of 29.4 %. This 
response rate is lower than the surveys by Lindell13) and Huang14) on Hurricane Lili (50.7%) and Ike 
                                                   
2 ResTO-TerRiN Project: French ministry of ecology, sustainable development and energy (MEDDE) 
funded project, entitled Contribution to the Systemic Modeling of Technical and Organizational 
Resilience of a Territory to Natech Risk: from microscopic to macroscopic (2013-2016).   
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(39.4%) respectively, but is higher than Siebeneck and Cova’s16) survey for 2008 Cedar Rapids, Iowa 
Flood (20.0%) and Mitchell et al’s17) survey for Graniteville, South Carolina, Chlorine Spill (20.8%).  
Fig 3.2 presents the distribution of (a) sampled households and (b) returned questionnaires in 15 
areas. The figure also shows a range for the elevation above sea level for each area (A1 to A15). It 
has to be noted that in order to protect privacy, we labeled each questionnaire with distance and 
direction to the industrial park only, instead of asking respondents to provide their detailed addresses 
or making any marks on questionnaire sheets. Thus, we only have the number of respondents from 
each of these areas. 
 
Fig 3.2 Distribution of (a) sampled households and (b) returned questionnaires in the 15 areas 
sampled including the range of the elevation above sea level for each area (A1-A15)
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Fig 3.3 Surveyed communities  
Note:  
1. 15 areas are combined into 8 areas (A1-A8) because some areas had low response rate 
2. the division of communities is based on the evacuation shelters map published by Tagajo city17) 
and Shichigahama town 18) 
3.3 Sample characteristics 
The questionnaire was composed of 14 pages with questions about respondents’ evacuation and 
reentry experiences regarding the Natech accidents during the GEJET. Of the 484 respondents, the 
average age was 61, and 55.8% were men. The majority were house owners with no evacuation or 
training experiences for Natech accidents. Households with couples and two generations answered 
36.2 % and 36.6 % of the questionnaires, respectively. The length of residence extends from less 
than ten year to more than 40 years. The results are summarized in Table 3-2.  
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Table 3-2 Demographic statistics for respondents 
Gender  House ownership 
Male Female No answer  Yes No No answer 
55.8% 38.2% 6.0%  89.7% 5.5% 4.8% 
Natech evacuation experience  Natech training experience 
Yes No No answer  Yes No No answer 
1.2% 92.4% 6.4%  12.0% 84.5% 3.5% 
Household size 
Single Couple 2 generations  3 generations >3 generations No answer 
6.4% 36.2% 36.6%  13.2% 5.1% 2.5% 
Residency length 
≤10 years >10≤20 years >20≤30 years  >30≤40years >40years No answer 
17.2% 19.6% 19.8%  16.7% 20.7% 6.0% 
3.4 Evacuation descriptive statistics 
3.4.1 Reasons for multiple evacuations/relocations 
Of the 484 respondents, 311 (64%) evacuated at least once, 149(31%) evacuated twice, 99 
(21%) evacuated three times and 41 (9%) evacuated four times. Furthermore, 153 out of 484 (32%) 
respondents indicated they did not evacuate, and 2 (0.4%) of them did not respond. Households 
evacuated more than once because of the multiple hazards they encountered or other reasons. 
Respondents were asked to indicate the reasons for each evacuation by providing a list of multiple 
options. 179 (37%) respondents said they evacuated due to the earthquake and/or tsunami at least 
once. Similarly, 125 (26%) respondents said they evacuated due to the Natech accident at least once. 
As indicated in Fig.3.4, for the first evacuation, 168 out of 311 evacuees evacuated because of the 
earthquake and/ tsunami (54%). 34 (11%) and 27 (9%) of them evacuated for receiving the Natech 
evacuation order and for perceiving its environmental threat, respectively. The number of 
respondents that indicated that they evacuated a second time due to the EQ/tsunami decreased 
substantially (21%). Instead, 30% of respondents indicated that they evacuated a second time for the 
Natech accident, and 26% of respondents had to relocate due to shelter problems such as shelter was 
too crowed or shelter lacked necessaries for the family members with special needs. During the third 
and fourth evacuations/relocations, the natural disaster and Natech accident were not the primary 
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reasons for evacuating. Besides indicating shelter problems, some respondents said they were 
rescued by the Self Defense Force or picked up by other family members.   
Fig 3.4 The percent of respondents during the multiple evacuations/relocations  
and the reasons for evacuating/relocating 
3.4.2 Distribution of evacuees 
As indicated in Table 3-3, respondents’ evacuation behavior varied among the eight areas 
(presented in Fig 3.3 A1-A8). Households in A1, A3, A4, and A8 evacuated mainly because of the 
EQ and/or tsunami. Households in A2 tended to evacuate owing to the compound function of the EQ 
and/or tsunami (18%) and the Natech evacuation order (18%). In A5, 27% of respondents evacuated 
owning to perceiving the Natech threat and 30% of them followed the Natech evacuation order. In 
A6, 32% of respondents complied with the Natech evacuation order, whereas, 34% of them stayed. 
Most respondents in A7 (60%) indicated they did not evacuate for any type of disasters. Table 3-3 
also shows that there were 166 respondents evacuated more than once and most of them from A2 
(63%) and A3 (72%), respectively. Moreover, as indicated in Table 3-3, a highly proportion of 
respondents in A2, A5, and A6 received the Natech evacuation order. In contrast, other areas rarely 
received the Natech evacuation order. 
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In summary, evacuation disparities for the Natech accident exist based upon locations. More 
households in A2, A5 and A6 evacuated due to the Natech accident than the rest areas. The first 
reason may be the disparities of the tsunami impact. For example, households in A1, A3, and A4 
may had had evacuated to the safe place when the Natech accident occurred, whereas households in 
A5 and A6 maybe at home when the Natech accident occurred. Another reason may be the 
disparities of the Natech evacuation order penetration, except A2, A5, and A6, households in other 
areas barely received the Natech evacuation order. According to our interview to the disaster officials 
in Tagajo city, the earthquake and/or tsunami damaged many outdoor warning facilities within few 
hours of the tsunami landfall. Moreover, it was difficult for local authorities to notice residents 
door-to-door, because many roads were blocked or inundated by the tsunami. This may be the reason 
that many residents in the areas under the jurisdiction of Tagajo city did not receive the Natech 
evacuation order. This is very dangerous for the areas that were not affected by the tsunami but 
within the Natech influencing scope, such as A7. Households in A7 were under the risk of being 
affected by the explosion but many of them did not prepare for it.  
Table 3-3 Number (%) of respondents by location, evacuation reasons, evacuation times and Natech 
evacuation order receipt 
Evacuation reasons A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 Total 
EQ and/or tsunami 5 42 55 17 15 15 29 36 214 
63% 43% 60% 71% 21% 18% 34% 51% 40% 
Natech evacuation order 0 18 7 1 20 26 2 1 75 
0% 18% 8% 4% 27% 32% 2% 1% 14% 
Natech environmental threat 
(own judgments) 
2 11 7 1 22 6 1 0 50 
25% 11% 8% 4% 30% 7% 1% 0% 9% 
EQ and/or tsunami& Natech 0 18 8 0 5 7 2 0 40 
0% 18% 9% 0% 7% 9% 2% 0% 8% 
Did not evacuate 1 9 14 5 11 28 51 34 153 
13% 9% 15% 21% 15% 34% 60% 48% 29% 
Total 8 98 91 24 73 82 85 71 532 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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3.5 Selected analysis method 
Both descriptive and inferential statistical methods were used in analyzing the collected data. 
Specifically, I used four inferential statistical methods: correlation analysis, logistic regression, 
Chi-square test, and independent samples t test. Correlation analysis is also called bivariate 
correlation analysis which can help us to determine whether two continues variables are related19). 
Using logistic regression we can predict a dichotomy dependent variable by a set of predictor 
variables20). Chi-square test is used to compare two or more patterns of frequencies to see if they are 
different from each other21). The independent t test is used for testing the difference between the 
means of two independent groups 22). 
3.5.1 Correlation analysis 
Correlation is primarily concerned with investigating whether a relationship exists and with 
determining its magnitude and direction. Typically, in a correlational study, no variables are 
manipulated as in an experiment-the researcher measures naturally occurring events, behaviors, or 
personality characteristics and then determines if the measured scores covary. The simplest 
correlational study involves getting a pair of observations or measures on two different variables 
from a number of individuals. The paired measures are then statistically analyzed to determine if any 
relationship exist between them22). 
 
Evacuation times A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 Total 
Once 1 25 19 11 33 22 22 16 149 
20% 37% 28% 58% 69% 51% 67% 52% 47% 
More than once 4 43 49 8 15 21 11 15 166 
80% 63% 72% 42% 31% 49% 33% 48% 53% 
Total 5 68 68 19 48 43 33 31 315 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Received the order 2 36 12 4 42 40 8 2 146 
1% 25% 8% 3% 29% 27% 6% 1% 100% 
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In order to show quantitatively the extent to which two variables are related, it is necessary to 
calculate a correlation coefficient. There are many types of correlations coefficients, depending on 
the level of measurement, the nature of the underlying distribution (continuous or discrete) and the 
characteristics of the distribution of the scores (linear or nonlinear)22). In this study, I used Person 
product moment correlation coefficient (r):  
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2 2
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Where Sx is the standard deviation of X; Sy is the standard deviation of Y; N is the number of 
observations, X and Y are two continuous variables.  
 
The values of the correlation coefficients vary between +1 and -1. Both of these extremes 
represent perfect relationships between the variables, and 0 represents the absence of a relationship. 
The positive relationship means that individuals obtaining high scores on one variable tend to obtain 
high score on a second variable. A negative relationship means that individuals scoring low on one 
variable tend to score high on a second variable22).  
        
Correlation analysis has been used to analyze the relationships between geographic variables 
and the use of information source (local news media, national news media, etc) and the information 
source (environmental cues, social cues, etc)13). Huang et al14) used correlation analysis to examine 
the relationships among demographic variables, decision making and evacuation departure time. 
Furthermore, correlation analysis was also used in indentifying the factors affecting evacuation 
logistics 23) and reentry concerns such as lack of utilities, being looting, being stuck in traffic upon 
the return trip, physical risk from damaged structures, etc24). In this study, correlation analysis was 
used to find the relationship between variables such as risk perception, respondents’ location, 
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demographic characteristics, and protective measures adoption. It was also used to identify which 
variables including risk perception, respondents’ locations, demographic factors and evacuation 
message have significant relationship with household evacuation timing behavior.  
3.5.2 Logistic regression  
Logistic regression allows one to predict a discrete outcome, such as group membership, from a 
set of variables that may be continuous, discrete, dichotomous, or mix of any of these. Generally, the 
dependent variable is dichotomous, such as male/female or success/failure. The logistic regress is 
flexible because it has no assumptions about the distribution of the predictor variables-the predictor 
variables do not have to be normal distributed, linearly related, or of equal variance/covariance 
across the groups22) . 
  
Using logistic regression, we can understand whether an outcome can be predicted from a 
selected set of independent variable; how reliable the logistic regression model is in classifying cases 
for whom the effect is known; and which independent variables predict the outcome, that is, increase 
or decrease the probability of the outcome or have no effect22). IBM SPSS Statistics software was 
used to conduct the logistic regression. The omnibus Tests of Model Confidents from the output of 
SPSS is used to answer whether adding the set of independent variables to the model has 
significantly increased our ability to predict the dependent variable (in general, p≤.05 is significant). 
SPSS provides various measures available to access model fit: -2Log Likelihood, Cox & snell R2, 
Nagelkerke R2, and Hosmer & Lemeshow test. According to Ho22), -2Log Likelihood is used to 
measure how poorly the overall model predicts variation in the outcome of interest. Cox & snell R2 
and Nagelkerke R2 are used to access the goodness-of-fit of logistic models, which higher values 
indicating a better model fit. Hosmer & Lemeshow test measures the correspondence of the actual 
and predicted values of the dependent variables. In this study, Nagelkerke R2 was used to present the 
reliability of the regression model. At last, the odds ratios, or Exp (B) can tell us which and how 
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strong the predictors significantly increase or decrease the odds (likelihood) of presenting the 
dependent variable.  
 
Research has been used logistic regression analysis to predict people’s evacuation and reentry 
behavior. For example, Huang et al14) used it to predict evacuation decision using independent 
variables including demographic characteristics, official warning, hurricane experience, coastal 
location, social cues, perceived storm characteristics, expected personal impacts, etc. Siebeneck et 
al24) used logistic regression analysis to predict return compliance based on demographic 
characteristics, location, and return concern variables. In this study, I used this method to predict 
households’ immediate evacuate behavior by risk perception, geographic and demographic variables.  
3.5.3 Chi-square test 
The chi-square test is most often used with nominal data, where observations are grouped into 
several discrete, exclusive categories, and where one count the frequency of occurrence in each 
category. The single variable chi-square test compares the observed frequencies of categories to 
frequencies that would be expected if the null hypothesis was true. The primary function of the 
chi-square test of independence is to determine whether two categorical variables are independent or 
related. In this study, chi-square tests were used to test the relationship between evacuees’ reentry 
date and their house locations. 
The formula for the Pearson chi-square:  
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Where f0 is the observed frequency; f0 is the expected frequency. The output of chi-square test 
includes Pearson chi-square value, the degrees of freedom, and the p-value. 
3.5.4 Independent t test 
The independent t test is particularly useful when the research question requires the comparison 
of variables obtained from two independent samples. For example, it can help to answer the question 
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such as “Do male and females differ in performance on standardized achievement test?” 22). In this 
study, the independent t tests were conducted using SPSS to test whether risk perception levels are 
different between early and late returnees. The outputs of independent t test include a t value, degree 
of freedom, and p-value. The p-value tells us if the significant difference between the two 
independent groups exists (p≤0.05)or not (P> 0.05).  
The formula is  
1 2
1 2
x x
x x
t
s


 …………………………………………………………………………..(3) 
Where X̅1-X̅2 is the difference between the two sample means; SX̅1− X̅2 is the standard error of 
the difference between the two means.
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Chapter 4  
 
Household Risk Perception and Behavioral Response 
 
In response to objective 1, this chapter presents the results of evacuee’s risk perception and 
protective behavior. The chapter begins by presenting the results of risk perception changes 
throughout the evacuation process. Next, respondents’ behavioral responses to the Natech accident 
are presented. The following section examines the factors that influence the risk perception levels 
and behavioral responses by Pearson correlation analysis. Section 4.4 predicts evacuation (yes or no) 
using logistic regression analysis. Section 4.5 summarizes the findings presented in the previous 
sections.  
4.1 Changes of risk perceptions 
I used likelihood and severity to measure the risk perception levels by asking: how likely do 
you think a Natech would be a threat to your life or property: 1 (＝very unlikely) to 5(＝very likely) 
before the GEJET, just after the earthquake shaking, and in the next 10 years. Furthermore, we asked 
to what extent households felt that a Natech would affect their lives or property: 1(＝small extent ) 
to 4 (＝very great extent) before GEJET, just after the earthquake shaking, when they perceived the 
occurrence of the Natech, when they received the Natech evacuation order, while staying at the 
evacuation shelters, and in the next 10 years. 
 
Results in Fig 4.1, show that household’s risk perception in terms of the perceived likelihood 
that a Natech would cause harm to their lives or property increased (as expected) after experiencing 
the Natech during the GEJET. However, as presented in Fig 4.2, no change was found in risk 
perception in terms of the perceived severity of the impacts of a Natech accident when compared 
with their responses before the GEJET and in the next 10 years. This may because no deaths, injuries 
or severe environmental damage due to the Natech was reported. In addition, I found that households 
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felt that the Natech was very serious a. when they perceived its occurrence, b. while they were 
staying at the first/second evacuation shelter and c. when they received the Natech evacuation order.  
Fig 4.1 Mean risk likelihood rating for Natech 
Fig 4.2 Mean risk severity ratings for Natech throughout the evacuation process 
 
Risk perception was analyzed in four time periods according to respondents’ geographic 
locations. These time periods are before the GEJET; just after the earthquake shaking; and when 
respondents perceived the Natech occurrence, and when they received Natech evacuation order. The 
results are presented in figures 4.3 and 4.4.  
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I studied the change in risk perception with the distance to the Natech hazard for each time 
period. As Fig 4.3 shows, risk perceptions decreased with distance to the Natech hazard in all time 
periods except when respondents received the Natech evacuation order. Notably, before the GEJET 
households within 1 km had much higher perceived likelihood of Natech threat than those living 0.5 
km further away. Furthermore, I examined the change in risk perception with the range of the 
elevation of the area of each household surveyed and its location direction (west, east) with respect 
to the Natech hazard. The results are presented in Fig 4.4. As Fig 4.4 shows households living in 
areas where the elevation is 5 meters or less had higher risk perception levels. In addition, 
households’ risk perception levels to the east of the Natech hazard were generally higher than to the 
west side.  
Fig 4.3 Mean perceived risk by distance 
Fig 4.4 Mean perceived risk by location direction and elevation 
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4.2 Behavioral response 
4.2.1 Protective actions adopted for the Natech accidents 
Respondents were specially asked to indicate what they did to protect themselves or family 
members, after perceiving the Natech accident. They were asked to select one or more of the 
following options: immediately evacuated; immediately prepared for evacuation; closed the 
windows and doors; tried to find more information (searched for information); got out of the house 
to see the accident situation (assessed situation); continued their normal activities; and did others.  
 
Fig 4.5 presents the protective actions taken by households after perceiving the Natech accident. 
For ease of analysis the protective actions have been classified into four groups as shown at the 
bottom of the figure. These results show that more than a third of respondents continued normal 
activities when they perceived the Natech (32.4%). Only 10.5% of respondents evacuated 
immediately, but 34.5% of them took other protective actions, such as prepared to evacuate or closed 
windows/doors, etc. It has to be noted that respondents who indicated they evacuated immediately 
and adopted other protective actions at the same time (e.g. close the windows/doors) were classed as 
‘evacuated’.  
 
Fig 4.5 Protective actions after perceiving the Natech accident (N=484) 
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Natech danger, some of them evacuated later. Table 4-1 presents households’ first evacuation for the 
Natech accident according to evacuation timing for the four groups as shown in Fig 4.5. As shown in 
Table 4-1, of the 484 respondents, 92 (19.0%) left home because of the Natech accident; whereas 
222 (45.9%) evacuated for the other reasons such as the earthquake, tsunami, etc. Furthermore, there 
were 153 (31.6%) respondents who did not evacuate. Among the Natech evacuees, 55.4% of them 
evacuated immediately after perceiving the Natech accident. 26.1% of them adopted other protective 
measures before evacuating. Moreover, 15.2% of them also evacuated even though they initially did 
nothing (13.0%) or did something else (2.2%) before evacuating. A high percentage (39.2%) of 
households did not evacuate, but sheltered at home by adopting other protective actions.   
Table 4-1 Number (%) of respondents by evacuation timing and reasons for evacuating 
 
Immediate 
evacuation 
 
Delayed evacuation 
  
 
 
Immediately 
evacuated 
 Other protective 
actions 
Did 
nothing 
Did 
others 
 
unknown Total 
Evacuated for the Natech 
51 
(55.4%) 
 24 
(26.1%) 
12 
(13.0%) 
2 
(2.2%) 
 3 
(3.3%) 
92 
(19.0%) 
Evacuated for other 
reasons 
0 
 79 
(35.6%) 
75 
(33.8%) 
55 
(24.8%) 
 13 
(5.9%) 
222 
(45.9%) 
Did not evacuate 0 
 60 
(39.2%) 
66 
(43.1%) 
25 
(16.3%) 
 
2(1.3%) 
153 
(31.6%) 
Unknown 0 
 4 
(23.5%) 
4 
(23.5%) 
4 
(23.5%) 
 5 
(29.4%) 
17 
(3.5%) 
Total 
51 
(10.5%) 
 167 
(34.5%) 
157 
(32.4%) 
86 
(17.8%) 
 23 
(4.8%) 
484 
(100%) 
 
Households’ behavioral responses to the Natech accident may be affected by their locations and 
risk perceptions. For example, respondents living near to the industrial park may have perceived the 
Natech earlier and considered it serious, which may have motivated them to evacuate immediately. 
In comparison, those living a little further or far from the industrial park may have perceived the 
Natech late and paid less attention to it. Thus, they may have chosen to shelter at home by adopting 
other protective actions such as search for more information or prepare to evacuate, or even to 
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continue their normal activities. 
4.3 Correlates  
4.3.1 Correlates of risk perception 
The relationship between risk perceptions and location and demographic characteristics in four 
time periods (before the GEJET; just after the earthquake shaking; when respondents perceived the 
Natech occurrence; and when they received the Natech evacuation order) were examined. 
Geographic variables included the house distance to the evacuation center, varying from (1＝D≤1km) 
to (4＝2km＜D≤2.5km); location with respect to the industrial park (1＝east, 0＝west); and the 
average elevation of each area. Demographic characteristics included gender (0=male, 1=female); 
age; household size (1=single, 2= couples, 3= two generations…5=more than three generations); and 
residence length (1= less than10 year…5=more than 40 years).  
 
As indicated in Table 4-2, respondents’ risk perceptions were associated with their locations. 
Specifically, significant negative correlations were found between distance to the industrial park and 
the risk perceptions in three time periods. This indicates that households’ risk perceptions before the 
GEJET; just after the earthquake shaking; and when they perceived the Natech accident decreased 
with the distance to the Natech hazards. Furthermore, I found that households living to the east of 
the industrial park felt that a Natech accident was more likely to threaten their lives or property 
before the GEJET(r=0.174) and just after the earthquake shaking (r=0.159). They also felt more 
threatened by the Natech accident when they received its evacuation order(r=0.157). In addition, the 
results indicate that households living in high places felt less threatened by the Natech accident just 
after the earthquake shaking (r＝-0.101). 
 
Gender and age were found to be correlated with risk perception. Specifically, men (r＝
-0.101/-.128) and the older (r＝0.150/0.162) were more likely to regard a Natech accident as a threat 
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to their lives or property before the GEJET and just after the earthquake shaking. However, younger 
households felt more threaten by the Natech accident when they perceived its occurrence(r＝-0.167). 
In addition, the results also show that long-term residents had higher risk perception levels in terms 
of perceived likelihood just after the earthquake shaking (r＝0.104).  
4.3.2 Correlates of protective actions 
I examined the correlations between location, demographic characteristics, risk perception, and 
three types of protective actions: immediate evacuation, delayed evacuation, and shelter in place. 
Based on the results in Table 4-2, respondents who indicated they evacuated immediately after 
perceiving the Natech were recorded as 1=yes, others were 0=no. Those who delayed evacuations 
were recorded as 1= yes, others were 0= no. Finally, those who sheltered in place were recorded as 
1= yes, others were 0= no. 
 
I found that households’ evacuation behavior differed significantly by locations. Specifically, 
households living in proximity to the Natech accident were more likely to evacuate at once when 
they perceived its threat (r=-0.119), whereas those living further tended to shelter in place (r=0.208). 
Moreover, those at a higher elevation were also prone to delay their evacuation (r=0.274) and shelter 
in place (r=0.179). Furthermore, those living to the east side of the industrial park were more likely 
to evacuate immediately (r=0.234) and, even for those did not evacuate initially were more likely to 
evacuate later than those in the west side (r=0.319).  
 
Households were also more likely to evacuate after perceiving the Natech accident if: a. they 
thought it very likely that their lives or property were threatened by the Natech accident before the 
GEJET and just after the earthquake shaking; b. they considered that the Natech would affect their 
lives and property to a very great extent just after the earthquake shaking and when they perceived it.  
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Table 4-2 Correlations among variables 
 
Geographic Variables Demographic Variables Risk Perception variables Protective actions 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. Distance  1                
2. Direction -.064 1               
3. Elevation .721** .465** 1              
4. Gender .004 .017 .007 1             
5. Age -.001 .002 -.031 -.148** 1            
6. HHSize .074 .070 .091* .184** -.189** 1           
7. Res_length .112* .062 .103* -.096* .373** .044 1          
8. L_before GEJET -.176** .174** -.023 -.101* .150** .028 .077 1         
9. S_before GEJET -.137** .092 -.052 .071 -.021 .014 -.033 .553** 1        
10. L_just after ES -.179** .159** -.031 -.128** .162** -.037 .104* .741** .431** 1       
11. S_just after ES -.178** .066 -.101* .039 .008 -.033 -.044 .414** .710** .562** 1      
12. S_after Per -.154** .068 -.061 .088 -.167** .056 -.090 .181** .335** .215** .431** 1     
13. S_when Rec -.002 .157* .027 .129 -.066 .053 .022 .044 .215** .026 .303** .465** 1    
14. Imm_evacuation  -.119** .238** .037 -.036 .011 -.024 .009 .133** .087 .214** .146** .117** .117 1   
15. Del_evacuation .074 .296** .274** -.001 .038 .048 .082 .020 .012 -.019 -.027 -.003 .052 -.109* 1  
16. Shel_in .208** .002 .179** -.001 .004 .085 -.012 .003 .050 -.007 .041 -.007 -.032 -.137** -.120* 1 
 
Note: Sample size range from 173 to 484 because of varying patterns of items nonresponse. **.P＜0.01； *.p＜0.05. 
1. Distance: respondent’s distance to the industrial park; 2. Direction: respondents’ direction to the industrial park; 3. Elevation: mean elevation of respondent’s living area; 
4. Gender: respondents’ gender; 5. Age: respondents’ age; 6. HH size: household size; 7. Res_length: residence length; 8. L_ before GEJET: Perceived likelihood of Natech 
before GEJET; 9. S_ before TE: Perceived severity of Natech before GEJET; 10. L _just after ES: Perceived likelihood of Natech just after earthquake shaking; 11. S_ just 
after ES: Perceived severity of Natech just after earthquake shaking; 12. S_ after Per: Perceived severity of Natech when perceived natech accident occurrence; 13. S_ 
when Rec: Perceived severity of Natech when received evacuation order; 14 Imm_evacuation: evacuated immediately once perceived the Natech; 15. Del_evacuation: 
delayed evacuation; 16. Shel_in: shelter in place 
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4.4 Prediction of immediate evacuation  
The logistic regression was conducted to predict households’ immediate evacuation behavior 
using geographic, risk perception, and demographic variables. As indicated in Table 4-3, predictor 
variables account for 32% (Nagelkerk -R2) of the variance in predicting evacuation after perceiving 
the Natech. Coefficients on two variables of interest are statistically significant. The first significant 
predictor indicates that people living to the east of the industrial park were approximately 12 times 
(exp (B) =11.41) more likely to evacuate when they perceived the Natech accident. The second one 
indicates that for each additional one-point increase in severity ratings when households perceived 
the Natech accident, they were 5.89 times (exp (B) =5.89) more likely to evacuate. The result of 
logistic regression concerning the distance effects (B=0.13) is inconsistent with the findings from 
correlation analysis (r=-0.12). This may because logistic regression reports the effects of each 
variable by controlling other factors, but correlation analysis does not. Furthermore, the regression 
coefficient of distance is not significant, thus, further research is needed to determine the effects of 
distance on immediate evacuate in other Natech evacuations.  
Table 4-3 Prediction of evacuation 
Variables B SE Exp(B)  
Distance 0.13 0.66 1.14  
Direction 2.44* 1.16 11.41  
Elevation -0.06 0.13 0.94  
L_ before GEJET 0.49 0.45 1.64  
S_ before GEJET 0.20 0.41 1.23  
L _just after ES 0.52 0.45 1.69  
S_ just after ES -0.48 0.50 0.62  
S_ after Per 1.77* 0.83 5.89  
S_when Rec -0.37 0.58 0.69  
Female -.003 0.57 0.10  
Age 0.04 0.03 1.04  
HH Size 0.37 0.29 1.44  
Res_length 0.04 0.16 1.04  
Constant -15.33** 4.50 0.00  
X2 27.86**    
df 13    
Nagelkerke R2 0.32    
**.P＜0.01； *.p＜0.05 
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4.5 Summary 
The objective of this chapter was to examine household risk perception and behavioral 
responses to a Natech accident. Guided by the four research questions, the first part of this chapter 
provided the changes of risk perception levels throughout the evacuation process. The results 
indicate Natech risk perception changed throughout the evacuation process. Comparatively low 
mean risk perception levels (in terms of perceived likelihood) occurred before the GEJET. Higher 
mean risk perception levels (in terms of perceived severity) occurred when households perceived the 
Natech accident, while they were staying at the first and second evacuation shelter, and when they 
received the actual Natech evacuation order. 
 
Section 4.2 presented household behavioral response to the Natech accident. It indicates that 
Among the Natech evacuees, more than half (55.4%) of them evacuated immediately after 
perceiving the Natech accident. The last 43.6% respondents evacuated later, in which 26.1% of them 
adopted other protective measures before evacuating. A high percentage (39.2%) of households did 
not evacuate, but sheltered at home by adopting other protective actions.   
 
The results from correlation analyses of risk perception in Section 4.3 suggest that risk 
perception levels decreased with distance to the Natech disaster. Furthermore, respondents living to 
the east of the industrial park felt more likely to be affected by the Natech accident before the 
GEJET , and just after the earthquake shaking than those living to the west. Moreover, men and older 
households were more likely to consider a Natech accident as a threat to their lives or property 
before the GEJET and just after the earthquake shaking. 
 
The results from correlation of behavioral response in Section 4.3 indicate that households 
living close to the industrial park were more likely to evacuate immediately after perceiving the 
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Natech accident, whereas those living further tended to shelter at home. Furthermore, those located 
to the leeward side (east) of the industrial park had higher risk perception and were more likely to 
evacuate. In addition, households on the east side of the industrial park were more likely to evacuate 
immediately when they perceived the Natech threat or evacuated later if needed. However, none of 
the four examined demographic variables were found to significantly correlate with protective 
behavior.  
 
Section 4.4 used logistic regression to predict Natech evacuation and found that people living to 
the east of the industrial park were approximately 12 times more likely to evacuate when they 
perceived the Natech accident. Furthermore, for each additional one-point increase in severity 
ratings when households perceived the Natech accident, they were 5.89 times more likely to 
evacuate.  
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Chapter 5  
 
Evacuation logistics 
 
The objective of this chapter is to answer the research questions proposed with objective 2: 
analyzing the logistics of household evacuation during the Natech accident. The first section 
provides descriptive statistics of participant responses to their departure time, transportation use, and 
shelter choices. The next section highlights the differences of departure time, transportation use and 
shelter choices according to household location and age. In order to further discuss the departure 
timing, section 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 examine the tendency of mobilization time as well as the roles of risk 
perception, location, and demographic factors play in household mobilization time. The last section 
concludes with a summary of the findings of analyses in the previous sections.  
5.1 Descriptive statistics of evacuation logistics 
5.1.1 Departure time  
Respondents were asked to indicate the time they started their evacuations. Fig 5.1 presents the 
departure time distribution of respondents who evacuated for EQ and/or tsunami, for receiving the 
Natech evacuation order and for perceiving the Natech environmental threats (own judgment). Fig 
5.1 shows that 60% of respondents who evacuated for the EQ and/or tsunami left within one hour of 
the tsunami landing (2-4 pm, March 11). For those decided to evacuate for the Natech accident based 
on their own judgment, almost 40% of them left between 7 pm and 8 pm, March 11. During the 
night of March 11, 21% of respondents who indicated they evacuated because of receiving the 
Natech evacuation order departed between 9pm and 10pm. On March 12, 26% and 17% of 
respondents started to evacuate for the Natech accident after receiving its evacuation orders from 
Shichigahama town and Tagajo city at 9:25am and 10:26am, respectively. The evacuation rate also 
increased between 3pm and 4 pm; however, after 4pm the number of departures became very low.  
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Fig 5.1 Departure time according to evacuation reasons 
5.1.2 Transportation mode 
In order to understand what transportation evacuees used to evacuate, respondents were asked 
to choose the options of personal cars, walking, riding with others (car pooling with friends/relatives 
or being picked up by officials), and others (bicycle or motorbike, etc). Results are presented in Fig 
5.2 according to the evacuation reasons. Fig 5.2 shows that 48% of respondents who evacuated 
because of the EQ and/or tsunami evacuated by walk, whereas 37% of them left driving personal 
cars. In comparison, about half of respondents drove their personal cars when they evacuated for the 
Natech accident either because of receiving its evacuation order (49%) or of perceiving its threat 
through its environmental cues (52%). 
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Fig 5.2 Transportation use according to evacuation reasons 
5.1.3 Shelter types 
Respondents were asked to report their evacuation shelter types. They were asked to choose the 
options I provided or give the name of their destinations. I summarized respondents’ answers and 
presented in Fig 5.3. As indicated in Fig 5.3, most respondents sheltered in the officially designed 
places regardless of evacuation reasons. The second largest group chose to go to their 
friends/relatives’ home. A very small amount of respondents sheltered in the rest places such as high 
ground, tsunami building, public places (shopping center and commercial buildings, etc), Japan 
Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) Camp Tagajo3, and others (convenience shop, and working 
place, etc). 
 Fig 5.3 Shelter types according to evacuation reasons 
 
                                                   
3 It was reported that during the GEJET, (JGSDF) Camp Tagajo was opened as the evacuation shelter due to the 
emergency situation, and accommodated more than 700 evacuees during the night of March 11. Available at: 
http://www.butsudannoharada.com/blog/2012/03/post-591.html  
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5.2 Factors affecting evacuation logistics 
5.2.1 Proximity to the Natech accident 
Respondents’ proximity to the coast/Natech accident was examined as one factor of influencing 
their use of transportation and choice of shelters. The proximity is measured by the house distance to 
the coast/Natech accident (≤1.5km and 1.5km-2.5km). Results are presented in Table 5-1. It 
indicates that respondents living further from the coast (1.5-2.5km) tended to walk to evacuate for 
the EQ and/or tsunami (57%); whereas those living closer to the coast (≤1.5km) tended to use 
personal cars (43%). However, this tendency was not found among the groups that evacuated for the 
Natech accident. Furthermore, Table 5-1 also indicates that proximity to the disaster did not play a 
role in households choosing the evacuation shelters. Most respondents chose officially designed 
places as their evacuation shelters regardless the evacuation reasons and distance to the disasters. 
Table 5-1 Transportation and shelter use by evacuation reasons and the distance to the Natech 
 
EQ and/or tsunami Natech evacuation order Own judgment 
Transportation ≤1.5km 1.5-2.5km Total ≤1.5km 1.5-2.5km Total ≤1.5km 1.5-2.5km Total 
Personal car 43% 29% 37% 32% 57% 49% 32% 68% 52% 
Walk 42% 57% 48% 27% 24% 25% 21% 24% 23% 
Rode with others 9% 10% 9% 23% 11% 15% 11% 4% 7% 
Others 6% 5% 6% 18% 9% 12% 11% 4% 18% 
Total 110 83 193 22 46 68 19 25 44 
Shelters 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Official shelters 56% 67% 61% 52% 72% 65% 29% 76% 56% 
Friends/relatives' home 22% 16% 20% 16% 7% 10% 29% 17% 22% 
High ground 4% 5% 4% 0% 17% 11% 10% 7% 8% 
(JGSDF) Camp Tagajo 3% 0% 1% 24% 0% 8% 19% 0% 8% 
Others 15% 12% 14% 8% 4% 6% 13% 0% 6% 
Total 112 92 204 25 46 71 21 29 50 
5.2.2 Respondents’ age  
Age might be a factor that affects respondents’ departure time and transportation use. For 
example, many older people are vulnerable, thus, they may start their evacuation late or cannot drive 
a car to evacuate by themselves. However, in an alternative situation, older people may have more 
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experience of evacuation or are more familiar with the hazards than younger people. Therefore, for 
the older people who have ability to undertake evacuation may depart early and drive personal cars.  
 
Fig 5.4 shows respondents’ age according to their departure time and evacuation reasons. 
Results in Fig 5.4 indicate that older people departed earlier than younger people did for the EQ 
and/or tsunami at the beginning of the disaster (2pm-4pm, March 11). Forty-three percent of the 
respondents aged 71 and over evacuated at the early stage of the disaster, while only 17% of those 
aged less than 50 left during this time.  
 
 
Fig 5.4 Respondents’ age by departure time and evacuation reasons 
 
Fig 5.5 presents respondents’ age according to their use of transportation and evacuation 
reasons. Fig 5.5 indicates that the proportion of those using personal car to evacuate for the EQ 
and/or tsunami decreased with age. 30% of respondents with the age less than 50 years old 
evacuated by personal car, whereas 22% of those with age over 71 years old did so. Furthermore, as 
indicated in Fig 5.5, the proportion of those evacuated by walk after receiving the Natech evacuation 
order increased by age, from 13% with the age less than 50 years old to 38% with age over 71 years 
old. However, this finding is based on a small sample (n=16), thus, further study should be 
conducted to testify it. 
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Fig 5.5 Transportation use by departure time and evacuation reasons 
 
5.3 Mobilization time  
One key question that should be understood with respect to the evacuation departure timing is 
the mobilization time. Because once a household decides to evacuate and selects a type of 
destination, they must decide whether to spend time preparing for the evacuation or to depart 
immediately1). The mobilization time has different definitions. Sorensen2) defined it as the difference 
between the time of warning receipt and the time of departure. Sadri et al1) referred to the 
mobilization time as the time gap between the decision to evacuate and the actual departure from the 
home or from the evacuation zone when the evacuation warning is applicable. Dixit et al3) 
interpreted mobilization time as the time a household needs to prepare to leave. Since households 
can decide to evacuate or not based on their own judgments of the hazard threat or due to the 
evacuation order given by local authorities, this study discussed household mobilization time after 
perceiving the Natech threat from the two sources.  
 
In this section, I analyze household mobilization times from the moment the Natech accident 
occurs and the moment evacuation occurs. Actual evacuation occurs (or not) based on personal (own) 
judgment of perceived risk or due to the evacuation order given by local authorities. Furthermore, 
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the influence of factors such as risk perception, household location, and respondents’ demographic 
characteristics are examined.  
5.3.1 Timing of responding to the Natech accident 
In the questionnaire, respondents were asked to indicate the time that 1) perceived the Natech 
accident; 2) received the Natech evacuation order, and 3) started to evacuate. Data concerning the 
time of perceiving the Natech accident and of responding to it based on households’ own judgment 
are presented with cumulative percentage in Fig 5.6. Fig 5.7 illustrates the cumulative percentage of 
the time of receiving the Natech evacuation order and of responding to it. As indicated in Fig 5.6, 
cumulatively 91% of respondents had perceived the Natech accident at 9-10 pm on March 11. 
However, the proportion of evacuees increased slowly during this time period. This may because it is 
harder to evacuate during the nighttime, thus, some households may be reluctant to evacuate 
during the night, especially for the family with people who need special needs. Fig 5.7 shows that 
the response function closely follows the receipt of evacuation order curve. This finding indicates 
that households evacuated faster after receiving the Natech evacuation order than those decided to 
evacuate based on personal judgment. That is, receiving the evacuation order can shorten household 
response time to the Natech threat. 
 
Fig 5.6 Timing of responding to the Natech accident based on own judgment 
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Fig 5.7 Timing of responding to the Natech accident due to receiving its evacuation order 
 
5.3.2 Mobilization time distribution 
Fig 5.8 and Fig 5.9 present the mobilization time between the Natech risk was perceived and 
actual evacuation (base on respondents’ own judgment and due to the evacuation order, respectively). 
Fig 5.8 shows that 11% of respondents evacuated based on own judgment departed immediately 
after perceiving the Natech accident. Another 36% of them departed later but within one hour after 
perceiving the Natech risk. The rest 53% of them did so but spent two or more than two hours. In 
comparison, as indicated in Fig 5.9, over half (55%) of respondents departed immediately after 
receiving the Natech evacuation order. The rest 45% of them departed for the Natech accident later 
after receiving the evacuation order.  
In order to further analyze which factors influenced the mobilization time, respondents were 
regrouped. As shown in Fig 5.8, respondents who evacuated within one hour after perceiving the 
Natech risk based on their own judgment were classed as “fast”, while those needed more than one 
hour to be mobilized were classed as “slow”. In a similar way, respondents who departed 
immediately after receiving the Natech evacuation order were classed as “fast”, while the rest 
belongs to the “slow” group (see Fig 5.9).  
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Fig 5.8 Mobilization timing of Natech accident based on own judgment (n=28) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 5.9 Mobilization timing of Natech accident due to receiving its evacuation order (n=44) 
5.4 Factors affecting mobilization time 
The relationship between mobilization time and the potentially influential factors were 
examined. The factors included risk perception, locations, and respondents’ demographic 
characteristics. Fig 5.10 presents the scatter plot with Pearson correlation coefficient (r) and 
significance level.  
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Fig 5.10 Relationship between mobilization time and risk perception, geographic and demographic variables
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5.4.1 Risk perception 
To measure the risk perception, we asked households to indicate to what extent they felt that a 
Natech would affect their lives or property: 1 (=small extent) to 4 (=very great extent) when they 
perceived the Natech occurrence, and when they received the Natech evacuation order. The results 
from correlation analyses show that households who felt their lives or property would be affected to 
a very great extent by the Natech accident after receiving the evacuation order tended to evacuate 
fast (immediately) (r=-0.43, p≤0.01). However, respondents’ risk perception level when they 
perceived the Natech accident was not found to be a significant factor affecting the mobilization time 
(see Fig 5.10). Our finding indicates that risk perception is not only a key factor in understanding the 
evacuation decision making process 5), but also a significant stimulus setting people off quickly after 
receiving the evacuation order.  
5.4.2 House location  
The location was measured by household house distance to the Natech accident, varying from 
(1=D≤1km) to (4=2km<D≤2.5km). Results from correlation analysis show that location was not a 
significant factor affecting the mobilization time (see Fig 5.10). The absence of the statistically 
significant correlation indicates that households living at greater distance mobilized as quickly as 
those living close to the Natech accident either by own judgment or due to receiving the evacuation 
order. The result confirms the finding from Reference2), which indicated that proximity to the 
emergency site did not lead to faster response.  
5.4.3 Demographic characteristics 
Respondents’ age and household size (1=single, 2=couples, 3= 2 generations, 4=3 generations, 
5=4 generations) were used to identify which group tended to response faster after perceiving the 
Natech accident and receiving its evacuation order.  
As indicated in Fig 5.10, age was significantly correlated with the mobilization time between 
the Natech risk was received and actual evacuation happened based on respondents’ own judgments 
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(r=-0.47). Specifically, older respondents tended to response faster (within one hour) than younger 
respondents. This may because older residents are more familiar with the phenomenon of the 
chemical accident, thus are more likely to response faster. Furthermore, larger families were also 
found to response faster after perceiving the Natech threat (r=-0.56). However, none of the two 
demographic variables were found to be significantly correlated with the mobilization time of 
households after they received the Natech evacuation order. 
5.5 Prediction of mobilization times 
Logistic regression and Quantification theory II were used to predict households’ mobilization 
times (fast or slow) of Natech accident based on their own judgment and due to receiving the 
evacuation order. Akaike information criterion (AIC) was used to estimate the relative quality of two 
models and to tell which one it better to explain the mobilization times.  
5.5.1 Logistic regression  
Table 5-2 shows the results by involving four predictors, namely risk perception, distance, age, 
and household size in the logistic regression models. When all four predictor variables are 
considered together, they significantly predict fast response after perceiving the Natech threat (own 
judgment), X2=20.96, df =4, p≤0.01. Table 5-2 presents the odd ratios (Exp (B)), which suggest that 
the odds of fast response to the Natech accident based on own judgment increasingly greater as the 
age and household size increase.  It also suggests that for each additional one-point in risk 
perception levels when households received the Natech evacuation order, they were 5.52 times more 
likely to evacuate immediately (fast). However, the model for predicting the fast response after 
receiving the Natech evacuation order is not significant.  
 
Table 5-2 Prediction of fast response with binary logistic regression 
Variables 
Own judgment Evacuation order 
B SE Exp (B) B SE Exp (B) 
Risk perception -2.21 2.40 0.11 1.71 0.78 5.52* 
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Distance 0.45 0.78 1.50 -0.04 0.40 0.97 
Age 0.20 0.09 1.22* -0.09 0.30 0.99 
Household size 2.07 1.00 7.95* -0.40 0.52 0.67 
Constant -10.82 11.17 0 -4.41 4.67 0.01 
X2 20.96(p≤0.01) 8.48 (p=0.08) 
df 4 4 
AIC -57.59 -58.27 
 
5.5.2 Quantification theory II 
Quantification theory II is used to determine if these four variables discriminate the “fast” and 
“slow” response groups. Results for the fast response to the Natech accident based on respondents’ 
own judgments are presented in Table 5-3 and Fig 5.11. Results revealed two strong determinants, 
namely age and household size. It shows that younger respondents (20-55 years group) tended to 
respond slowly, whereas older respondents (>66 years group) tended to respond fast to the Natech 
accident based on their own judgments. Similar results were found among the group with different 
household size. Larger families tended to respond fast, whereas those with smaller household size 
tended to response slowly. 89.3% of the cases were correctly reclassified into their original 
categories.  
 
Table 5-3 Results of fast response to the Natech accident based on respondents’ own judgment using 
quantification theory II 
Item Category Category score Frequency Range 
Risk Perception Higher 0.40 23 
0.84 
Lower -0.44 5 
Distance Further -0.05 16 
0.08 
Nearer 0.03 12 
Age 20-55 1.91 8 
2.5 56-65 -0.06 11 
>66 -0.59 9 
Household size 1 generation 1.22 11 
1.89 2 generations 0.58 7 
≥3 generations -0.67 10 
Centroid for fast response group: -1.21      Constant: -2.6 
Centroid for slow response group: 1.05      Hit ratio: 89.3% 
Separation point: -0.08                   AIC: -51.2 
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Fig 5.11 Category score of fast response to the Natech accident based on respondents’ own judgment 
using quantification theory II 
Table 5-4 and Fig 5.12 present the results of the fast response to the Natech accident due to 
receiving the evacuation order. Respondents’ risk perception level and age were found to strongly 
influence their fast response to the Natech evacuation order. We found that households who thought 
their lives or property would be affected by the Natech accident to a very great extent tended to 
evacuate immediately after receiving its evacuation order. Furthermore, those older than 66 years 
responded faster, whereas the 56-65 years group responded slower to the Natech evacuation order. 
Table 5-4 Results of fast response to the Natech accident due to receiving the evacuation order using 
quantification theory II 
Item Category Category score Frequency Range 
Risk Perception Higher -0.62 28 
1.7 
 Lower 1.08 16 
Distance Further 0.20 34 
0.89 
 Nearer -0.69 10 
Age 20-55 0.06 13 1.12 
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 56-65 0.56 15 
 >66 -0.57 16 
Household size 1 generation 0.02 15 
0.42  2 generations -0.09 23 
 ≥3 generations 0.33 6 
 
Centroid for fast response group: -0.53      Constant: 0.16 
Centroid for slow response group: 0.64      Hit ratio: 75.1% 
Separation point: 0.06                    AIC: -52.03 
 
 
Fig 5.12 Category score of fast response to the Natech accident due to receiving the evacuation order 
using quantification theory II 
Logistic regression and Quantification theory II present similar results concerning the factors 
affecting household mobilization times. However, due to the smaller AIC values, logistic regression 
models are better to explain household fast response to the Natech accident either by own judgment 
or due to the evacuation order. 
 5.6 Summary 
The goal of this chapter was to analyze the logistics of household evacuation during the Natech 
accident. The first section of this chapter provided descriptive statistics of evacuees’ departure time, 
transportation use and the choice of evacuation shelters. The descriptive statistics showed that the 
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evacuation for the EQ and/or tsunami peaked within about one hour of the earthquake occurrence. 
The peak time for the Natech evacuation based on evacuees’ own judgment started about two hours 
after the observation of black smoke from the refinery. For the group that evacuated because of 
receiving the Natech evacuation order, most of them departed within one hour after the evacuation 
orders issued. The descriptive statistics also showed that respondents tended to evacuate for EQ 
and/or tsunami by walk, whereas driving personal cars for the Natech accident. Moreover, the 
officially designated shelters were the first choice of both EQ and/or tsunami and Natech accident 
evacuees.  
 
Results from section 5.2 indicate that proximity to the hazards (coast or Natech accident) 
influenced the use of transportation for the EQ and/or tsunami but not for the Natech accident. 
Specifically, those who lived further to the coast were more likely to evacuate by walk, whereas 
those living close to the coast tended to use their own cars. Furthermore, age was found to influence 
household departure time and transportation use. Older people tended to depart earlier than the 
younger people did and were less likely to take personal car when they evacuated for the EQ and/or 
tsunami. Moreover, older people tended to evacuate by walk after receiving the Natech evacuation 
order. However, the last finding needs further test due to the small sample size. 
 
Section 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 presented the results of analyzing household mobilization times and the 
affecting factors. The results indicate that receiving the evacuation order can shorten the responding 
time to the Natech accident comparing to those evacuated based on own judgment. Furthermore, the 
results indicate that there was a relationship between risk perception after receiving the Natech 
evacuation order and the mobilization time. In addition, older respondents and larger families tended 
to evacuate within one hour based on own judgment after perceiving the Natech threat.  
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Chapter 6  
 
Reentry timing 
 
To answer the research questions in objective 3, this chapter presents the results of analyzing 
household reentry timing. The chapter begins by providing the general descriptions of household 
reentry characteristics after evacuating for the Natech accident. It includes the receipt of “4all-clear 
message”, the reentry time and the reasons led households to return home in advance. Section 6.2 
presents the distribution of reentry timing for the Natech accident. Section 6.3 examines the factors 
that influence the reentry timing. The factors include respondents’ house location, risk perception, 
and age. The last section summarizes the findings of this chapter.  
6.1 General results of reentry characteristics 
As indicated in section 3.4.1 , of the 484 respondents, only 125 households evacuated for the 
Natech accident, and thus, were relevant to this return-entry study, so the following analyses used the 
data reported by the 125 Natech accident related evacuating respondents.  
 
According to the general results listed in Table 6-1, 42% of respondents received the all-clear 
message from local officials. However, 40% of them violated it and had gone back before receiving 
it. For the reasons of returning home in advance, 34% of returnees said they were anxious about their 
home, thus, they went back to see the damage situation and clean the house. 28% of them did so was 
because of the shelter problem, such as lack of food, water, or the necessaries for the family 
members with special needs. A relatively small group of respondents concerned about the danger of 
Natech accident (14%) and if the tsunami would come back (10%) when they started to return. There 
were 10% of respondents returned because of seeing others going back home.  
 
                                                   
4 All-clear message is the message issued by local authorities indicating the termination of an evacuation  
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The low compliance rate of the all-clear message may because evacuees received late or 
communicated ineffectively of the information about the damage situation of their living area or the 
severity of the Natech accident while they were staying at the shelters. The factors such as 
impatience, inconvenience and fear of looting may outweigh the concerns of early reentry. 
Table 6-1 General results of reentry behavior 
  Frequency Percent 
All-clear message 
  
Received 53 42% 
Did not receive 55 44% 
Unknown 17 14% 
Total 125 100% 
Return time 
  
Before receiving the all-clear message 50 40% 
After receiving the all-clear message 7 6% 
Unknown 68 54% 
Total 125 100% 
Reasons for returning in advance*  
  
Tsunami may not come back 14 11% 
Concerned about home 46 35% 
The Natech was no danger anymore 19 15% 
Shelter problem 38 29% 
Other people begun to return 13 10% 
Total 130 100% 
*multiple answers are possible 
6.2 Timing of reentry 
The distribution of the time that households started to go back home is presented in Fig 6.1. 
Due to the missing data for some variables in the data set, the observations are reduced to 54 
observations. Fig 6.1 shows that the majority (53%) of those evacuated returned home within two 
days of the Natech accident occurrence. Additional 25% returned home two days later (March 13). 
Five days after the accident, 94% of all respondents had returned. Fig 6.1 also shows that the largest 
proportion of respondents started to return home between 1pm and 6pm on March 12 (23%), a few 
hours after Shichigahama town and Tagajo city issued the Natech evacuation order. The second large 
group returned between 7am and 12am on March 13 (19%). These results are consistent with the 
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report of Shichigahama town1). It reported after receiving the Natech evacuation order on March 12, 
some tsunami evacuees decided to go back home instead of moving to the next shelter was because 
they were informed that the shelters they intended to move to were occupied. In addition, shelter 
problems, especially cold and inconvenient, were also mentioned as the reason led many evacuees to 
return before the evacuation orders were cancelled. It also reported that on March 13, many evacuees 
begun to return to check the damage situation of their houses. Reentry rates in other time periods 
were relatively low.  
Fig 6.1 the distribution of return date and time (N=54) 
 
In addition, in order to understand how long respondents had been away from home (evacuation 
duration), I calculated the time interval between evacuation and reentry, presenting in Fig 6.2. It 
shows that the biggest proportion of respondents (27%) begun to return within 6 hours after leaving 
home, and 25% of them did so between 7 and 12 hours. After 12 hours the percent dropped to 19% 
and gradually decreased to 8%. 
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Fig 6.2 Frequency distribution of evacuation duration (N=52) 
6.3 Factors affecting the timing of reentry 
6.3.1 House location 
House location may play a role in influencing households’ reentry timing. For example, those 
living near the coast may be more worried about their houses or property being affected by the 
tsunami than those locating further away. Thus, they may return to the areas that still under the 
lingering danger of Natech hazards such as uncleared toxic chemicals or flammable materials. 
However, for those living further from the coast with less likelihood of being affected by the tsunami 
may also return home early because they may want to protect their home from looters. Moreover, 
house location may also influence the evacuation duration. For example, households living close to 
the coast may have longer evacuation durations because much time is needed to clean their living 
areas by local officials. In comparison, those living far away from the coast may not need to wait for 
a long time for returning home.  
 
To ease analysis, the date and time of return was classified as two groups: returned on 3/11 and 
3/12, and returned on 3/13 and later. Similarly, the evacuation duration was also classified as two 
groups: 12 and within 12 hours, and more than 12 hours. House location was measured by the 
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distance to the evacuation center (D≤1.5km and D>1.5km).  
 
Results in Table 6-2, show that the house location significantly influenced the return date but 
not the evacuation duration. Sixty percent of respondents living between 1.5 and 2.5 km to the 
Natech accident returned home earlier (3/11 and 3/12); whereas, 71% of those living within the 
1.5km, returned home later (3/11 and later). This result suggests that distance to the Natech disaster 
negatively associate with the date that households returned home (chi-square, χ2=4.10, df=1,p=0.04). 
However, the influence of shelter type and evacuation distance was not considered. This is because 
in this study, most evacuees sheltered in the officially designed places where were not far from their 
home. Therefore, further study should examine the differences of reentry date among the groups that 
evacuate to other places such as friends/relatives’ home, etc, or travel for a long distance. Even 
though, I did not find the significant difference between house location and the evacuation duration 
based on chi-square test, the difference did exist. 73% of respondents living within 1.5km returned 
12 hours later after leaving home, whereas 59% of those beyond 1.5km tended to reenter within 12 
hours. Further studies should be conducted to testify the significance of this result.  
Table 6-2 Return date and evacuation duration by house location 
House 
location 
Return date 
(χ2=4.10,df=1,p=0.04) 
Evacuation duration 
(χ2=3.40,df=1,p=0.07) 
3/11-3/12 3/13 and later Total <12h >12h Total 
≤1.5km 4 10 14 3 8 11 
 
29% 71% 100% 27% 73% 100% 
1.5-2.5km 24 16 40 24 17 41 
 
60% 40% 100% 59% 41% 100% 
Total 28 26 54 27 25 52 
 
52% 48% 100% 52% 48% 100% 
 
6.3.2 Risk perception 
Risk perception has been found to be a key factor in evacuation behavior2) and significantly 
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related to hazard adjustments3). Risk perception may also influence reentry date and evacuation 
duration. For example, households may return home later or extend the evacuation duration if they 
perceive a higher risk associated with reenter such as being hurt by damaged structures, or being 
affected by the released chemicals. In this study, household risk perceptions were measured by 
asking them to indicate to what extent they felt the Natech accident would affect their lives or 
property (1=to a small extent, 4=to a very great extent) while staying at the evacuation shelter and 
before deciding to return.  
 
Risk perception was analyzed according to the reentry date and evacuation duration. The results 
are presented in Fig 6.3. Independent t-tests were used to find the significant relationships. Results 
show that returnees who returned home later (3/13 and later) perceived a higher level of risk while 
staying at the evacuations shelters than those who returned earlier (3/11 and 3/12) (t=-2.26, df=38, 
p=0.029). Furthermore, those perceived a higher risk of Natech accident while staying at the 
evacuations shelters tended to have a longer evacuation duration (>12h, t=-2.32, df=35, p=0.026). In 
addition, I also found that those who returned home earlier (3/11 and 3/12) and had a shorter 
evacuation duration (≤12h) perceived a higher risk before deciding to go back home. However, the 
results were not significant based on the independent t-tests.  
 
Fig 6.3 Mean risk perception by the reentry date and evacuation duration 
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6.3.3 Age 
Older evacuees were found to be more likely than younger counterparts to return to the areas 
they evacuated even though these areas were heavily damaged by the Hurricane Katrina4). This may 
because older people often have stronger ties to their communities, thus, they desire to return to the 
original places they lived. Furthermore, Siebenck et al 5) found that older people were less likely to 
concern about the physical risk from structures when they decided to return home after experiencing 
the Hurricane Ike. The attachment to the home and less concerned about the physical risk may lead 
an aged evacuee to return home early and to be less likely to spend a long time away from home.  
 
As indicated in Table 6-3, the reentry date and evacuation duration were not significantly 
different among the groups with different age based on chi-square test. However, those older than 66 
years returned home later and spent a longer time on evacuation duration comparing to the rest two 
groups (less than 55 years and 56-65 years). Specifically, 65% of the respondents older than 66 years 
returned home on March 13 or later; whereas a higher proportion of the less than 55 years age group 
(64%) and 56-65 years age group (61%) returned home on March 11 or March 12. Furthermore, 63% 
among those older than 66 years spent more than 12 hours on evacuation duration. In comparison, 
most respondents among 56-65 year group spent less than 12 hours (69%). For the less than 55 year 
group, the proportions of spending less than 12 hours and more than 12 hours were the same.  
 
The results are contrary to my assumption that older people may return home early and less 
likely to wait for a long time to return. One possible explanation for the unexpected results is that 
older people may be more familiar with the phenomenon of the chemical accident and can imagine 
the severe consequence easily. Such concerns about being affected may delay their reentry and lead 
them to wait for a long time until it is safe to return. Another reason may be that some older people 
need more assistance than others during the reentry phase such as clean or rebuild their houses. Thus, 
they may have to wait for their relatives/friends or local officials to help them.  
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Table 6-3 Reentry date and evacuation duration by respondents’ age 
    less than 55 years 56-65 years 66 and over years 
  Time N % N % N % 
Reentry date 
(χ2=3.49,df=1,p=0.17) 
3/11-3/12 7 64% 11 61% 7 35% 
3/13 and later 4 36% 7 39% 13 65% 
Total 11 100% 18 100% 20 100% 
Evacuation duration 
(χ2=3.54,df=1,p=0.16) 
≤12h 6 50% 11 69% 7 37% 
>12h 6 50% 5 31% 12 63% 
Total 12 100% 16 100% 19 100% 
6.4 Summary 
In response to the objective 3, this chapter examined evacuees’ reentry timing as well as the 
potentially influential factors. The general description of reentry characteristics in section 6.1 
showed that a high proportion of reenters returned home before the local official issued the all-clear 
message (40%), and the actual percentage is expected to be higher because 54% of data sets were 
missing or incomplete. Concerned about home and the shelter problem were reported as the primary 
reasons for early returns. Results from section 6.2 showed that over half of evacuees returned home 
within two days after the Natech accident occurred. Furthermore, 27% and 25% of returnees spent 
less than 6 hours and 7-12 hours away from home after evacuating, respectively. Section 6.3 found 
that households living in proximity to the Natech accident returned home later and spent more time 
on evacuation duration than those living further away. Furthermore, the results indicate that 
household risk perception level while they stayed at the evacuation shelter significantly influenced 
their reentry date and the hours they waited for returning home. At last, we found that older 
respondents (older than 66 years) returned home later and spent more time away from home than the 
younger counterparts did.
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Chapter 7 
 
Discussion  
 
This chapter discusses the results of the behavioral response (chapter 4), evacuation logistics 
(chapter 5), and reentry timing (chapter 6). Section 7.1 focuses on discussing how risk perception 
varies throughout the Natech evacuation process and explaining the findings concerning behavioral 
response to the Natech accident. Section 7.2 summarizes and compares the findings of evacuation 
logistics with former studies. The last section discusses and explains the findings of reentry timing. 
7.1 Behavioral response results 
The first objective of this dissertation was to examine household risk perception and behavioral 
response to the Natech accident. The first task was to answer how residents’ risk perception changed 
throughout the multiple Natech evacuation process. Recognizing the changes of risk perception can 
assist in understanding when people take protective actions such as evacuation1). This is important to 
understand the role that risk perception plays in triggering multiple evacuations. A former study has 
shown that public risk perception is positively correlated with public response and adjustment to a 
particular hazard event2). However, emergency managers also need to know when household 
evacuation may begin (e.g., evacuation based on own judgment, after an evacuation order) to 
allocate emergency sources or start special protective plans. The results show that higher household 
risk perception in terms of perceived severity of the Natech accident for four time periods: when 
they perceived the Natech accident occurred, when they received its evacuation order, and while 
they were staying at the first/second evacuation shelter.  
 
The second task was to identify what protective actions households adopted in response to the 
Natech accident. Results show that only 10.4% of respondents evacuated immediately after 
perceiving the Natech threat, whereas 34.5% of them adopted other protective actions instead. This 
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finding is consistent with Ref. [3] about households’ immediate response to the 2009 American 
Samoa Earthquake and Tsunami. They also found that people did not leave immediately after the 
shaking stopped but attempted to obtain additional information from peers, authorities or news 
media, packed an emergency kit, warned other, or protected property. Searching more information is 
also found to be one of the primary protective actions in this study (12% of respondents tried to do 
so). Furthermore, a relatively large group of respondents (32.4%) continued their normal activities 
after perceiving the Natech accident. Unaware of the Natech risk or unfamiliar with the Natech 
phenomenon may be the reason.  
 
The third task of objective one was to explore whether households in different locations 
perceived different Natech risk or adopted different protective actions. Statistical analysis was 
carried out and indicates that risk perception levels decreasing with distance to the industrial 
accident. This finding are consistent with a former study which concluded that perceived personal 
risk of flood, hurricane and toxic chemicals hazards had a significant negative relationship with 
distance to hazard sources 4). Furthermore, I also found that respondents living to the east of the 
industrial park felt more likely to be affected by the Natech accident before the GEJET, and just after 
the earthquake shaking than those living to the west. Referring to the Japan Meteorological Agency5), 
the most frequent wind direction of the investigated area during the Natech accident was northwest5). 
This indicates that households living in the eastside may have been more worried about their safety 
because they could smell or see the smoke driven by the wind. To understand why households in the 
east side believed the Natech could affect their lives or property to a very great extent after receiving 
the evacuation order, we need further analysis. Lindell and Perry6) state that warning source, warning 
channels and message content stimulate recipients to establish a threat belief and response to the 
disaster6). Further research could examine the way that these three components influence risk 
perception when households received the Natech evacuation order.  
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Concerning the protective actions, I found that households living close to the industrial park 
were more likely to evacuate immediately after perceiving the Natech accident, whereas those living 
further tended to shelter at home. According to Huang et al7), this is because closer to the hazards 
households are more likely to personalize the risk by anticipating more severe impacts from them7). 
The study also indicates that households located to the leeward side (east) of the industrial park were 
more likely to immediately when they perceived the Natech threat or evacuated later if needed. This 
is good news for fire or toxic releases where the wind direction may carry the flames or toxic vapors 
in that direction. However, residents on the windward side may be at risk of explosion hazards and 
thus should also be aware of the potential dangers and the actions that they should take to protect 
themselves. Therefore, measures should be also taken to increase their Natech related knowledge and 
disaster preparedness. Wind direction may explain this phenomenon. Table 7-1 shows that during the 
duration (5 days) of the Natech accident, the most frequent wind direction was northwest for four 
days and southeast for one day. This indicates that more households to the east side may have 
evacuated because they smelled the smoke driven by the wind. Besides, the examination of the 
relationship between the risk perception and evacuation behavior by both correlation and regression 
analysis suggests that households were more likely to evacuate immediately if they felt their lives or 
property would be impact by the Natech accident to a very great extent when they perceived its 
occurrence.  
Table 7-1 Most frequent wind direction and speed during the Natech accident5) 
Date 
Most frequent  
wind direction 
Average wind speed 
(m/s) 
3/11 Northwest 2 
3/12 Northwest 1.8 
3/13 Northwest 1.9 
3/14 Northwest 3.2 
3/15 Southeast 2.7 
Note: wind direction refers to the direction the wind is coming from 
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Results of the fourth task indicate that demographic characteristics have inconsistent or no 
correlation with the risk perception and protective actions. My results regarding gender are 
inconsistent with a former study, which found that women perceived disaster events or threats as 
more severe and risky than men8). However, I found that men were more likely to consider a Natech 
accident as a threat to their lives or property in two time periods: before the GEJET and just after the 
earthquake shaking. Age may play a role in this result, because older respondents were also found to 
be more likely to worry about their lives or property being affected by a Natech accident in the same 
time periods. Thus, further studies should be conducted to analyze the risk perception of subgroups 
such as older women or younger men. Moreover, age was not a persistent determinant of risk 
perception, for after perceiving the Natech accident, the older respondents conversely regarded the 
Natech a less severe threat. At last, no examined demographic variables were found to correlate with 
protective actions.  
7.2 Evacuation logistics results 
Chapter 5 examined household evacuation logistics in terms of departure time, transportation 
use and shelter choice. Consistent with Lindell et al’s finding of Hurricane Lili evacuation, most 
households left on the day of evacuation warnings (orders)9). However, over half of respondents 
(51%) left on the day of Natech occurred before the Natech evacuation order issued authorities next 
day. The delay of issuing evacuation order may because the earthquake and/or tsunami had destroyed 
many communication devices that used to communicating emergency information. Another reason 
may because the refinery is under the jurisdiction of three cities, thus much time would be wasted on 
transforming the risk information among them. Lindell et al found that overwhelming majority of 
evacuating households took their own vehicles (90%) and only 3% of them stayed in the public 
shelter during the Hurricane Lili evacuation9). These findings are not fully supported by this study. In 
this study, the largest group evacuated for EQ and/or tsunami by walk (48%) and the majority of 
them went to the officially designated shelters (61%). Furthermore, most Natech accident evacuees’ 
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driving personal cars (51%), and 61% of them went to the officially designated shelters. Such 
differences may due to the warning time. Two days before the Hurricane Lili landfall, the National 
Hurricane Center had issued a hurricane watch and updated this to a hurricane warning one day later. 
Thus, residents had at least two days to decide or prepare for a long distance evacuation trip. 
However, in the situation of this study, the tsunami arrived about only 30 minutes after the big 
tsunami warning. Therefore, walking to the nearest officially designated shelters may be fast and 
safest way to evacuate. For the Natech accident occurred five hours later, the percentage of personal 
car usage increased, but officially designated shelters were still the first choice for most evacuees. 
This may because in Japan, the public shelters provide better accommodations and were not far from 
residential areas.   
 
   The second research question of this section was to explore the effects of households’ age and 
locations on evacuation logistics. Oder households was found to leave earlier for the EQ and/tsunami. 
This phenomenon was also observed during the Hurricane Lili evacuation9). Furthermore, older 
people was found to be less likely to drive personal car for the EQ and/tsunami. This finding is 
consistent with Ref.[10], which found that older evacuees tended to use carpools. As to the locations, 
the only difference was that 43% of households living closer to the coast (≤1.5km) evacuated by 
personal car, whereas 57% of those living further away (1.5-2.5km) evacuated by foot. As shown in 
Fig 3.3, almost all areas within 1.5km to the coast were inundated by the tsunami. Thus, it is possible 
that, residents living in these areas were told to evacuate fast to the far places. Therefore, many of 
them chose to use personal cars.  
 
    The third and fourth research questions concern the mobilization time. Mobilization time in this 
study refers to the time gap between the moment the Natech accident occurs and the moment 
evacuation occurs. The actual evacuate is motivated by personal own judgment and the evacuation 
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order. Inconsistent with Sorensen’s finding based on a hazardous material fire accident, level of 
perceived threat did not lead to faster response to the evacuation warning11), this study found that 
households tended to evacuate immediately if they felt their lives or property would be affected by 
the Natech accident to a very great extent after receiving its evacuation order. The inconsistence may 
due to the different measurement of risk perceptions. In Sorensen’s work, perceived threat was 
measured as a three point scale of no danger, some danger, and imminent severe danger. In 
comparison, I measured risk perception levels by asking respondents to indicate to what extent they 
felt the Natech would affect their lives or property with four point scale (1=to a small extent;4=to a 
very great extent). Another two findings pertaining to the mobilization time based on respondents’ 
own judgment have not been examined in former studies. I found that older households and larger 
families were more likely evacuate fast (within one hour) after perceiving the Natech threat. 
However, these findings need further confirmations.  
7.3 Reentry timing results 
Chapter 6 aimed to understand evacuees’ reentry timing. Specifically, I examined the roles of 
risk perception; household locations and age have on the reentry timing. One of the challenges to 
interpret the results of this section is that existing research on individual and household reentry 
timing is quite limited. Consequently, this section focuses on suggesting possible explanations of the 
results and indicating future studies.  
 
The first finding is that households’ risk perception while staying at the evacuation shelter 
significantly influenced their reentry date and evacuation duration. Specifically, those who thought 
their lives or property would be affected by the Natech accident to a very great extent while staying 
at the evacuation shelter tended to return home late and spend more time on evacuation duration. 
However, as indicated by Siebeneck and Cova12), evacuees may change the amount of risk they are 
willing to accept. Factors such as impatient, inconvenience, fear for looting, and financial hardship 
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may not change evacuees’ risk perceptions, but instead provide reasons for accepting the risks 
associated with returning early. Thus, in order to reduce the rate of early reentry, emergency mangers 
should find ways to increase evacuees’ risk perception levels. One suggestion is to provide enough 
information about the consequence of the Natech accident such as its potential harm on health and 
environment to evacuees.  
 
The second finding is that households living in proximity to the Natech accident returned 
home later and spent a longer time on evacuation duration than those living further away. Mitchell et 
al13) (2005) found the same results when they reported the evacuation behavior in response to the 
Graniteville, South Carolina, Chlorine Spill. They found that respondents in the one-mile evacuation 
zone evacuated earlier but returned to their homes later than those in two-mail evacuation zone, as 
those neighborhoods closest to the crash site were reopened last. This finding is good news for the 
local officials who are in charge of detecting and maintaining the security of the evacuated area. 
Residents living in proximity to the Natech disaster are the least expected to return early because if 
they do so, they would be affected by the aftermath of the Natech accident.  
 
The last finding of this chapter is that older respondents were more likely to return home later 
and spent more time on evacuation duration than the younger counterparts did. The result is 
unexpected. The elderly were supposed to be more eager to return home because they may find a 
greater sense of security at home rather than with relatives or friends or at an emergency center14). To 
understand why older respondents returned home later we need further analysis. One explanation 
may be that after the tired evacuation, many aged evacuees were unable to return home without 
enough rest. Another reason may be that older evacuees could get some special care such as bigger 
space to have a rest, or blanket to keep warm, etc, but younger evacuees who could not get such 
supplies may return back home earlier. 
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Chapter 8  
 
 Conclusion 
 
The focus of this research was to advance understanding of household protective actions before, 
during and after evacuating for the Natech accident. There were three objectives for this dissertation. 
The first objective was to examine household risk perception and behavioral responses to the Natech 
accident. The second objective was to analyze the logistics of household evacuation during the 
Natech accident. The last objective was to understand household reentry timing after evacuating for 
the Natech accident. The results were obtained by examining the data collected from the randomly 
selected households with 2.5 km of a Natech occurred at an industrial park in Sendai of Japan during 
the GEJET. The following sections present the main findings and implications on emergency 
management, study limitations as well as the future research needs. 
8.1 Primary results and implication on Natech accident emergency management 
Interestingly, the evacuation process following the GEJET and the Natech accident involved 
multiple evacuations. The results of this research showed that Natech risk perception changed 
throughout the evacuation process. Specifically, risk perception (in terms of likelihood) before the 
GEJET, and just after the earthquake shaking; risk perception (in terms of severity) just after the 
earthquake shaking and when households perceived the Natech accident have a positive effect on 
evacuation behavior. Moreover, households’ risk perception (in terms of severity) when they 
received the Natech evacuation order positively affect their response time. Furthermore, the study 
confirmed that risk perception has a significant effect on evacuation behavior (positive), response 
time after receiving the Natech evacuation order (positive), and reentry timing (negative). Thus, 
finding ways to improve households’ risk perception concerning Natech hazards may lead to 
increased evacuation; shortened response time after receiving the evacuation order and decreased 
early reentry for any future Natech accident.  
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The results of this research indicate that geographic location played an important role in 
household evacuation and reentry behavior. Households with homes located in proximity to the 
Natech accident were more likely to evacuate immediately after perceiving its occurrence and return 
home later after evacuation. These findings may relief some emergency managers who worry about 
residents closer to the Natech risk may refuse to leave or return early. Furthermore, the study 
indicates that households located to the leeward side (east) of the industrial park were more likely to 
evacuate. This is also good news for fire or toxic releases where the wind direction may carry the 
flames or toxic vapors in that direction. However, residents located in a longer distance to the Natech 
accident and on the windward side may be at risk of explosion hazards and thus should also be aware 
of the potential dangers and the actions that they should take to protect themselves. Therefore, local 
authorities should develop strategies to increase their Natech related knowledge and disaster 
preparedness.  
 
The study showed that almost 30% of respondents evacuated at least once for the Natech 
accident. However, the majority did not evacuate immediately adopting some other protective 
actions instead when they perceived the Natech threat. Inside this group, 12% of respondents tried to 
search for more information. Unfortunately, there is very little information currently provided to 
residents living near industrial parks in Japan concerning hazards resulting from the handling of 
hazardous materials and the measures they can take to protect themselves in the case of a chemical 
accident, and even less concerning the chemical accidents triggered by an earthquake. Therefore, 
local government officials and industrial facility operator should provide more information and 
instructions to residents about protective measures.  
 
The results showed that 40% of respondents returned home before the local official issued the 
all-clear message. The actual percentage is expected to be higher because of the missing or 
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incomplete data sets (54% of them). Concerning about home and the shelter problem were reported 
as the primary reasons for early reentry. This finding suggests that in order to increase the 
compliance rates with the reentry order, local officials or emergency managers should provide 
enough information concerning evacuees’ living area during the period of their evacuation. The 
information should include the damage situation of their houses and neighborhoods, the fire control 
process, and the potential consequence of the Natech accident such as the contamination of air, water 
or soil, and the harm to their health if they return early. An alternative is to let evacuees to check 
their homes with some protections. For example, during the Hurricane Ike, some communities 
announced a look-and-leave reentry plan which allowed residences to assess damage to their 
property behind the seawall and to decide if they want to return1). Emergency managers can follow 
this example to develop plans that allow the Natech evacuees to check their homes behind the wall 
or under other protections.  
8.2 Limitation and future studies 
Although this study examined the effects of three significant factors (risk perception, location, 
and demographic characteristics) on household Natech evacuation and reentry behavior, there could 
be other factors. For example, house damage state was not discussed in this study. Severely damaged 
house may force people to evacuate immediately or return later. Another limitation of this study is 
the potential sample bias. The information of residents who had had moved their home away from 
the Natech affected area when we conducted the survey is unknown. This group of residents may be 
affected by the Natech accident heavily, and their information may contribute to this study greatly. 
However, it is difficult to find their new addresses; thus, this study is based on the residents who did 
not move away.  
 
Even though, I have tried to collect information of households with special needs members such 
as the old, children, or the disabled (see Appendix question 13 and 14), only a small proportion of 
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households replied. Thus, this study does not analyze the protective actions of this group. However, 
future study is needed because evacuating households with special needs members are likely to be 
distinctly more complex than for the general population2). Another group should also be pay 
attention to is the transients. As Lindell et al, indicated evacuations for most transients are easier than 
for residents because they lack property to protect and they can easily remove their important 
belongings because they packed them to bring them into the risk area2). However, no empirical data 
is available for this group. Thus future study should examine the Natech protective behavior of this 
group.  
 
Further study can also examine the role of hazard adjustments in household protective actions 
for the imminent threat posed by Natech accidents. Hazard adjustment refers to hazard mitigation 
and emergency management interventions to reduce disaster impacts. The term of hazard adjustment 
is more frequently applied to long-term risk reduction actions such as hazard mitigation, emergency 
and recovery preparedness3). Hazard mitigation refers to actions taken previously that provide 
passive protection to people and property at the time of disaster impact (e.g. strengthening structural 
connections among house components to reduce the likelihood of house collapse). Emergency 
preparedness supports active response at the time of disaster impact (e.g. stocking supplies of bottled 
water and packaged food before a disaster coming). Hazard adjustments and the affecting factors 
have been discussed in contexts of earthquake4), volcano and forest fire5). However, up to now, 
household hazard adjustment studies available in the scientific literature have not addressed the 
conjoint Natech hazards. Therefore, future study could examine the role of hazard adjustment in 
Natech protective behavior.  
 
There is much unknown about return-entry movement after evacuating for the Natech accident. 
This study has only explored the nature of reentry time which is very important especially for 
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chemical and Natech accidents. Other issue such as communicating reentry information is also very 
important and more problematic. Siebeneck and Cova6) indicated that in evacuation, emergency 
managers know where the threatened population is located, and they can concentrate communication 
efforts on a very specific area. In the return-entry case, however, evacuees can be distributed over a 
very large geographic area. Thus, it is more difficult to target evacuees and communicate with them. 
Further research should address how to communicate reentry information effectively. For example, 
future study should identify the most reliable information source for evacuees (authorities, mass 
media or relatives/friends) and the most effective channel for dissemination reentry information (TV, 
radio or internet, etc).  
 
This study provides insights into the household evacuation and reentry behavior in response to a 
Natech accident. Hazard researchers and emergency managers can benefit greatly from improved 
knowledge about household protective actions throughout the Natech disaster. The findings of this 
study can aid in creation of improved evacuation and reentry strategies to protect millions of 
residents from the future Natech threats.  
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Ⅰ．地震前についてお伺いします  
Ⅰ．Before the GEJET 
1.  2011 年 3 月 11日の地震より前に、地震等の自然災害で、石油コンビナート事故が発生
する可能性はあると思っていましたか [一つに○] 
1. Before the GEJET, how likely did you think a Natech accident would be a threat to your live or 
property? [Choose one] 
A. 非常にあると思っていた   
Very likely  
B. ある程度あると思っていた  
Likely 
C. すこしあると思っていた 
Somewhat likely 
D. あまりないと思っていた  
Somewhat unlikely 
E. まったくないと思っていた  
Very unlikely 
2. １．で A～D を選択した方にお伺います。回答した石油コンビナート事故は、どの程度
の災害になると思っていましたか [一つに○] 
2. If you chose answers A-D of question 1, please indicate to what extent did you think the 
Natech accident would affect your live or property? [Choose one] 
A. 重大な災害 
To a very great extent 
B. やや重大な災害 
To a great extent 
C. 中程度の災害 
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To some extent  
D. 小規模の災害 
To small extent 
E. その他（具体的に）                    
Others (please specify)                        
II ．2011 年 3 月 11 日の地震時についてお伺いします 
II ．During the GEJET 
3.  地震が発生した直後、石油コンビナート事故が発生する可能性があると思いましたか 
[一つに○] 
3.  Just after the earthquake shaking, how likely did you think a Natech accident would be a threat 
to your live or property? [Choose one] 
A. 非常にあると思っていた   
Very likely  
B. ある程度あると思っていた  
Likely 
C. すこしあると思っていた 
Somewhat likely 
D. あまりないと思っていた  
Somewhat unlikely 
E. まったくないと思っていた  
Very unlikely 
4.  3.で、回答した石油コンビナート事故は、どの程度の大きさの災害になると思いました
か [一つに○] 
4.  If you chose answers A-D of question 3, please indicate to what extent did you think the Natech 
accident would affect your live or property? [Choose one] 
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A. 重大な災害 
To a very great extent 
B. やや重大な災害 
To a great extent 
C. 中程度の災害 
To some extent  
D. 小規模の災害 
To small extent 
E. その他（具体的に）             
Others (please specify)                        
III． 3 月 11 日の地震後に発生した石油コンビナート事故について 
III． The Natech accident on 11th March, 2011 
5. いつ、石油コンビナート事故に気付きましたか [一つに○]  
5.  When did you perceive the occurrence of the Natech accident? [Choose one] 
A. 地震直後 
Just after the earthquake shaking  
B. 大津波警報を知った頃  
When received the big tsunami warning 
C. 押し寄せる津波を見た頃 
When saw the surging waves 
D. 津波が来た直後 
Just after the tsunami landfall 
E. 津波が来た数時間後 
A few hours after tsunami subsided 
F. 3 月 11 日の夜 
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During the night of 11th March 
G. 翌日 
The next day 
H. 数日後 
A few days later 
I. 石油コンビナート事故による避難勧告・指示を聞いた時 
When received the Natech evacuation advisory/order  
J. 気付かなかった       10．の質問へ進んでください。 
Did not perceive it          Please turn to Question 10 
 気付いた場合、気付いた日時をお知らせください。 
 If you perceived the Natech accident, please indicate the specific time 
2011 年 3 月    日 午前・午後      時頃 
          （どちらかに○） 
    Day, March, 2011,     time (am, pm) 
6. どのようなきっかけで石油コンビナート事故に気付きましたか[全てに○] 
6.  How did you perceive the Natech accident? [Choose all you got] 
A. 炎や煙を見たり爆発の音を聞いて 
Heard the explosion noise and/or saw the burning fire and smoke 
B. 石油くさいにおいがして 
Smelled the burned oil 
C. 近所の人が逃げるのを見て 
Saw neighbors evacuating  
D. 近所の人から聞いて 
Had been told by neighbors 
E. マスメディアで知って 
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Got information from mass media  
F. 防災行政無線の放送で知って 
Got information from DISASTER PREVENTION ADMINISTRATION RADIO 
SYSTEM （DPARS） 
G. その他 (具体的に):               
Others (Please specify it)                          
7. 石油コンビナート事故に気付いた時、どこにいましたか [一つに○] 
7. Where were you when you perceived the Natech accident? [Choose one] 
A. 自宅にいた 
At home 
B. 自宅以外の建物内 (地震前からいた建物） 
The building where you were before the earthquake (other than home) 
C. 避難先にいた 
In the evacuation shelter 
D. 路上で避難中だった 
On the road towards to the evacuation shelter 
E. その他の理由で路上にいた 
On the road for other reasons 
F. その他 (具体的に):       
Others (Please specify):                          
8. 石油コンビナート事故に気付いてから次のことをしましたか [全てに○] 
8. What did you do after perceiving the occurrence of the Natech accident? [Choose all you did] 
A. すぐに避難した 
Immediately evacuated  
B. すぐ避難できるように準備した 
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Immediately prepared for evacuation 
C. 家の窓とドアを閉めた 
Closed windows and doors 
D. 石油コンビナート事故の情報を得ようとした 
Tried to find more information of the Natech accident 
E. 家から出て、石油コンビナート事故の様子を見に行った 
Went out of the house to see the accident situation 
F. 特に何もしなかった 
 Done nothing 
G. その他 (具体的に):          
Others (Please specify):                          
9. 石油コンビナート事故に気付いた時、石油コンビナート事故は、どの程度の災害となる
と感じましたか。[一つに○] 
9. When you perceived the Natech accident, to what extent did you think the Natech would affect 
your live or property? [Choose one] 
A. 重大な災害 
To a very great extent 
B. やや重大な災害 
To a great extent 
C. 中程度の災害 
To some extent  
D. 小規模の災害 
To small extent 
E. その他（具体的に）             
Others (please specify)                        
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IV．3 月 11 日の地震後の避難について 
IV．Evacuation after the earthquake 
10. 地震・津波や、石油コンビナート事故で避難しましたか 
10. Did you evacuate for the Earthquake, Tsunami, or Natech accident?  
A. 避難した    
Yes, evacuated  
B. 避難しなかった    16．の質問へ進んでください 
No       Please turn to Question 16 
11. 避難先、避難した時刻、避難した理由について、次のページに、最初の避難先、及び、
その後、再度避難した場合の２つめの避難先、３つめの避難先、４つ目の避難先について、
順次ご記入ください。（避難先が１か所の場合は、11.から 15.までの質問については、｢最初
の避難先」についてのみ、お答えください） 
11. Please indicate your evacuation location, evacuation starting time, and evacuation reasons.  
A. 最初の避難先 
Evacuation shelter for the first time evacuation  
1) 避難先の名称をご記入ください               
Please indicate the name of your evacuation shelter                
避難先の種類 (一つに○) Shelter types (Choose one) 
 
1. 指定の避難所（学校、公園、ホテル、病院） 2. 海岸から離れた場所（高台） 
3. 指定の津波避難ビル 4. 集合住宅や商業ビルなど 
5. 公共施設やショピングモール等 6. 友人・知人・親戚宅 
7.その他 (具体的に):           
 
1. Officially designed evacuation shelters 
(School, Garden, Hotel, Hospital) 
2.Locations far away from the sea 
(High ground) 
3.Tsunami evacuation building 4.Mansions/ apartments and business 
buildings, etc 
5.Public facilities and shopping mall, etc 6. friends/ relatives’ home 
7.Others (please specify):                                            
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2) 最初の避難先へ避難を開始した時刻をご記入ください 
Please indicate when did you start to evacuate?  
    3 月  日 午前・午後      時頃 
            （どちらかに○） 
      Day, March,         time (am, pm) 
3) その時避難した理由を以下から選んでください（全てに○） 
Please indicate the evacuation reasons. (Choose all applied) 
1. 地震の発生 2. 津波が来ると思った 3.大津波警報を知った 
4.石油コンビナート事故の発生 5. 石油コンビナート事故による指示 
6. 周りの人が避難した 7. その他 (具体的に):                        
 
1. Earthquake  2. The tsunami may come 3. Big tsunami warning  
4.Natech accident 5. Natech evacuation order 
6. Neighbors begun to evacuate  7. Others (please specify):                                 
 
B. 2 つ目の避難先 
Evacuation shelter for the second evacuation/relocation 
1) 避難先の名称をご記入ください                
Please indicate the name of your evacuation shelter                
避難先の種類 (一つに○) Shelter types (Choose one) 
 
1. 指定の避難所（学校、公園、ホテル、病院） 2. 海岸から離れた場所（高台） 
3. 指定の津波避難ビル 4. 集合住宅や商業ビルなど 
5. 公共施設やショピングモール等 6. 友人・知人・親戚宅 
7.その他 (具体的に):           
 
1. Officially designed evacuation shelters 
(School, Garden, Hotel, Hospital) 
2.Locations far away from the sea 
(High ground) 
3.Tsunami evacuation building 4.Mansions/ apartments and business 
buildings, etc 
5.Public facilities and shopping mall, etc 6. friends/ relatives’ home 
7.Others (please specify):                                            
 
2)  2 つ目の避難先へ避難を開始した時刻をご記入ください 
Please indicate when did you start to evacuate to the second evacuation shelter?  
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      3月  日 午前・午後      時頃 
           （どちらかに○） 
      Day, March,         time (am, pm) 
3)  その時避難した理由を以下から選んでください（全てに○） 
1. 余震の発生 2. 津波か来た 3. 大津波警報を知った 
4. 石油コンビナート事故の発生 5. 石油コンビナート事故による指示 
6. 周りの人が避難した 7. その時までいた避難先は安全ではなかった 
8. その時までいた避難先は不便だった（食べ物・水・ガスがなかった等） 
9. その時までいた避難場には子供・老人・障がい者への配慮がなかった 
10. その他 (具体的に):                            
Please indicate the evacuation reasons. (Choose all applied) 
1. After shock 2. The tsunami came 3. Big tsunami warning  
4. Natech accident 5. Natech evacuation order 
6. Neighbors begun to evacuate 7. Current evacuation was not safe 
8. Inconvenient at current evacuation shelter(Short of food, water, gas, etc)  
9. No special care for the old, children and/or the disables.  
10. Others (please specify):                                                 
 
C. 3 つ目の避難先 
Evacuation shelter for the third evacuation/relocation 
1) 避難先の名称をご記入ください                
Please indicate the name of your evacuation shelter                
避難先の種類 (一つに○) Shelter types (Choose one) 
 
1. 指定の避難所（学校、公園、ホテル、病院） 2. 海岸から離れた場所（高台） 
3. 指定の津波避難ビル 4. 集合住宅や商業ビルなど 
5. 公共施設やショピングモール等 6. 友人・知人・親戚宅 
7.その他 (具体的に):           
 
1. Officially designed evacuation shelters 
(School, Garden, Hotel, Hospital) 
2.Locations far away from the sea 
(High ground) 
3.Tsunami evacuation building 4.Mansions/ apartments and business 
buildings, etc 
5.Public facilities and shopping mall, etc 6. friends/ relatives’ home 
7.Others (please specify):                                            
 
2)  3 つ目の避難先へ避難を開始した時刻をご記入ください 
Please indicate when did you start to evacuate to the third evacuation shelter?  
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      3月  日 午前・午後      時頃 
           （どちらかに○） 
      Day, March,         time (am, pm) 
3)  その時避難した理由を以下から選んでください（全てに○） 
1. 余震の発生 2. 津波か来た 3. 大津波警報を知った 
4. 石油コンビナート事故の発生 5. 石油コンビナート事故による指示 
6. 周りの人が避難した 7. その時までいた避難先は安全ではなかった 
8. その時までいた避難先は不便だった（食べ物・水・ガスがなかった等） 
9. その時までいた避難場には子供・老人・障がい者への配慮がなかった 
10. その他 (具体的に):                            
Please indicate the evacuation reasons. (Choose all applied) 
1. After shock 2. The tsunami came 3. Big tsunami warning  
4. Natech accident 5. Natech evacuation order 
6. Neighbors begun to evacuate 7. Current evacuation was not safe 
8. Inconvenient at current evacuation shelter(Short of food, water, gas, etc)  
9. No special care for the old, children and/or the disables.  
10. Others (please specify):                                                 
 
D. 4 つ目の避難先    
Evacuation shelter for the fourth evacuation/relocation 
1) 避難先の名称をご記入ください                
Please indicate the name of your evacuation shelter                
避難先の種類 (一つに○) Shelter types (Choose one) 
 
1. 指定の避難所（学校、公園、ホテル、病院） 2. 海岸から離れた場所（高台） 
3. 指定の津波避難ビル 4. 集合住宅や商業ビルなど 
5. 公共施設やショピングモール等 6. 友人・知人・親戚宅 
7.その他 (具体的に):           
 
1. Officially designed evacuation shelters 
(School, Garden, Hotel, Hospital) 
2.Locations far away from the sea 
(High ground) 
3.Tsunami evacuation building 4.Mansions/ apartments and business 
buildings, etc 
5.Public facilities and shopping mall, etc 6. friends/ relatives’ home 
7.Others (please specify):                                            
 
2)  4 つ目の避難先へ避難を開始した時刻をご記入ください 
Please indicate when did you start to evacuate to the fourth evacuation shelter?  
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      3月  日 午前・午後      時頃 
           （どちらかに○） 
      Day, March,         time (am, pm) 
3)  その時避難した理由を以下から選んでください（全てに○） 
1. 余震の発生 2. 津波か来た 3. 大津波警報を知った 
4. 石油コンビナート事故の発生 5. 石油コンビナート事故による指示 
6. 周りの人が避難した 7. その時までいた避難先は安全ではなかった 
8. その時までいた避難先は不便だった（食べ物・水・ガスがなかった等） 
9. その時までいた避難場には子供・老人・障がい者への配慮がなかった 
10. その他 (具体的に):                            
Please indicate the evacuation reasons. (Choose all applied) 
1. After shock 2. The tsunami came 3. Big tsunami warning  
4. Natech accident 5. Natech evacuation order 
6. Neighbors begun to evacuate 7. Current evacuation was not safe 
8. Inconvenient at current evacuation shelter(Short of food, water, gas, etc)  
9. No special care for the old, children and/or the disables.  
10. Others (please specify):                                                 
 
12. 避難時の移動手段はどれでしたか。 
12. What transportation did you/ your family used for evacuating?  
A. 最初の避難先に向かった時（当てはまるものに○） 
Towards to the first evacuation shelter (Choose what you used) 
1.自家用の車 2. 友達・知人の車 3. 行政機関などが準備した車 
4. バイク 5. 自転車 6. 徒歩 7. その他 (具体的に):         
 
1. Self-use vehicle  2. Friends/relatives’ car  3. Official cars 
4. Motorbike  5. Bicycle 6. Walking 7. Others (please specify):                                
 
B. 2 つ目の避難先に向かった時（当てはまるものに○） 
Towards to the second evacuation shelter (Choose what you used) 
1.自家用の車 2. 友達・知人の車 3. 行政機関などが準備した車 
4. バイク 5. 自転車 6. 徒歩 7. その他 (具体的に):         
 
1. Self-use vehicle  2. Friends/relatives’ car  3. Official cars 
4. Motorbike  5. Bicycle 6. Walking 7. Others (please specify):                                
 
C. 3 つ目の避難先に向かった時（当てはまるものに○） 
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Towards to the third evacuation shelter (Choose what you used) 
1.自家用の車 2. 友達・知人の車 3. 行政機関などが準備した車 
4. バイク 5. 自転車 6. 徒歩 7. その他 (具体的に):         
 
1. Self-use vehicle  2. Friends/relatives’ car  3. Official cars 
4. Motorbike  5. Bicycle 6. Walking 7. Others (please specify):                                
 
D. 4 つ目の避難先に向かった時（当てはまるものに○）  
Towards to the fourth evacuation shelter (Choose what you used) 
1.自家用の車 2. 友達・知人の車 3. 行政機関などが準備した車 
4. バイク 5. 自転車 6. 徒歩 7. その他 (具体的に):         
 
1. Self-use vehicle  2. Friends/relatives’ car  3. Official cars 
4. Motorbike  5. Bicycle 6. Walking 7. Others (please specify):                                
 
13. 避難先へ向う時、誰と一緒に避難しましたか。また、一緒に避難した人に、子供（5歳
未満）、高齢者（75歳以上）、障がい者などの要援護者がいましたか。 
13.  Who evacuated with you together? Children (less than 5 years old)? Old people 
(more than 75 years old), and the disables?  
A. 最初の避難先に向かった時  
Towards to the first evacuation shelter 
家族  人、近所  人、その他  人、合計   人で避難した。 
 その中に、子供（5 歳未満）  人、高齢者（75歳以上）  人、障がい者  人 
  Family members      , Neighbors       , Others       , Total         
  Children            , the old         , the disables            
B. 2 つ目の避難先に向かった時  
Towards to the second evacuation shelter 
家族  人、近所  人、その他  人、合計   人で避難した。 
 その中に、子供（5 歳未満）  人、高齢者（75歳以上）  人、障がい者  人 
  Family members      , Neighbors       , Others       , Total         
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   Children            , the old         , the disables            
C. 3 つ目の避難先に向かった時 
Towards to the third evacuation shelter 
家族  人、近所  人、その他  人、合計   人で避難した。 
 その中に、子供（5 歳未満）  人、高齢者（75歳以上）  人、障がい者  人 
  Family members      , Neighbors       , Others       , Total         
  Children            , the old         , the disables            
D. 4 つ目の避難先に向かった 
Towards to the fourth evacuation shelter 
家族  人、近所  人、その他  人、合計   人で避難した。 
 その中に、子供（5 歳未満）  人、高齢者（75歳以上）  人、障がい者  人 
Family members      , Neighbors       , Others       , Total         
  Children            , the old         , the disables            
14. 子供（5 歳未満）、高齢者（75歳以上）、障がい者などの避難で特に困ったことがあれば
ご記入ください。 
14.  Please indicate if you had met any difficulties when evacuating with the children, the old or the 
disables. 
 
 
15. それぞれの避難先にいた時、石油コンビナート事故はどの程度の災害となると感じまし
たか。 
15.  While staying in the evacuation shelters, to what extent did you think the Natech would affect 
your live or property? [Choose one] 
A. 最初の避難先にいた時（一つに○） 
At the first evacuation shelter 
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1. 重大な災害 2. やや重大な災害 3. 中程度の災害 
4. 小規模の災害 5. その他(具体的に）：         
 
1. to a very great extent 2. to a great extent 3. to somewhat extent 
4. to small extent 5. Others (Please specify)                   
B. 2 つ目の避難先にいた時（一つに○） 
At the second evacuation shelter 
1. 重大な災害 2. やや重大な災害 3. 中程度の災害 
4. 小規模の災害 5. その他(具体的に）：         
 
1. to a very great extent 2. to a great extent 3. to somewhat extent 
4. to small extent 5. Others (Please specify)                   
C. 3 つ目の避難先にいた時（一つに○） 
At the third evacuation shelter 
1. 重大な災害 2. やや重大な災害 3. 中程度の災害 
4. 小規模の災害 5. その他(具体的に）：         
 
1. to a very great extent 2. to a great extent 3. to somewhat extent 
4. to small extent 5. Others (Please specify)                   
D. 4 つ目の避難先にいた時（一つに○）   
At the fourth evacuation shelter 
1. 重大な災害 2. やや重大な災害 3. 中程度の災害 
4. 小規模の災害 5. その他(具体的に）：         
 
1. to a very great extent 2. to a great extent 3. to somewhat extent 
4. to small extent 5. Others (Please specify)                   
 
V．石油コンビナート事故による避難についての指示について 
V．Natech evacuation order 
16. 石油コンビナート事故による避難についての指示を受けましたか。 
16.  Did you receive the evacuation order?  
A. 受けた Yes 
B. 受けなかった    23．の質問へ進んでください。 
No         Please turn to Question 23 
17. いつ避難についての指示を受けましたか。その日時をご記入ください。 
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 2011 年 3 月    日 午前・午後   時頃 
                  （どちらかに○） 
17. When did you receive the evacuation order? Please indicate the time of receiving it.  
             Day, March, 2011        time (am, pm) 
18. 避難についての指示を受けた時、どこにいましたか [一つに○] 
18. Where were you when you received the evacuation order? [Choose one] 
A. 自宅にいた 
At home 
B. 自宅以外の建物内 (地震前からいた建物） 
The building where you were before the earthquake (other than home) 
C. 避難先にいた 
In the evacuation shelter 
D. 路上で避難中だった 
On the road towards to the evacuation shelter 
E. その他の理由で路上にいた 
On the road for other reasons 
F. その他 (具体的に):       
Others (Please specify):                          
19. 避難についての指示を何で知りましたか [全てに○] 
19. How did you receive the evacuation order? [Choose all you used] 
A. 防災行政無線の戸別受信機 
Indoor receivers 
B. 防災行政無線の屋外スピーカー 
  Loud speakers 
C. テレビ・ラジオ等 
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        TV, and radio, etc 
D. 広報車 
Public-relation vehicles 
E. 役場職員・警察官から 
Local authorities (Staffs on scene, police) 
F. 家族から 
Family members 
G. 近隣から 
Neighbors 
H. 仕事関係者から 
        Colleagues 
I. その他 (具体的に):           
Others (Please specify):                
20. 避難についての指示内容は次のことが含まれていましたか[全てに○] 
20.  Were items listed below included in the evacuation order message? [Choose all included] 
A. 石油コンビナート事故が発生した場所 
The location of the Natech accident 
B. 事故現場からあなたの地域までの距離 
Distance to the Natech accident 
C. 石油コンビナート事故の危険性の原因 
The descriptions of the Natech severity 
D. 避難先 
Evacuation shelter location 
E. 避難の方法（徒歩、車、その他：     ） 
Evacuation methods (walking, by car, others:        ) 
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F. 避難上の注意 
Matters need attention during evacuation 
G. 事故発生場所から 2km以内についての立ち入り禁止 
No entry into 2km of the Natech accident 
H. その他 (具体的に):                  
Others (Please specify):                  
21. 避難についての指示を受けた時、石油コンビナート事故は、どの程度の災害とな
ると感じましたか [一つに○] 
21. When you received the evacuation order, to what extent did you think the Natech accident would 
affect your live or property?  
A. 重大な災害 
To a very great extent 
B. やや重大な災害 
To a great extent 
C. 中程度の災害 
To some extent  
D. 小規模の災害 
To small extent 
E. その他（具体的に）                    
Others (please specify)                        
22. 避難についての指示の内容について、どのように感じましたか？[あてはまるもの
全○]               
22. How did you think about the evacuation order message? [Choose all you thought] 
A. 適切だと思った 
The message was appropriate 
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B. 避難についての指示範囲はもう少し狭くてよかったと思った 
        The evacuation range were too large 
C. 必要な情報が欠けていた 
Lack of important information 
D. 指示の内容がよくわからなかった 
I did not know the meaning of the evacuation message 
E. その他(具体的に):          
Others (Please specify):                
VI． 帰宅について 
VI．About Reentry  
23. 避難先から、一時的に自宅に戻りましたか。 
23.  Did you temporarily go back home?  
A. 一時的に自宅に戻った。(24.の質問へ進んでください) 
Temporarily went back home (please turn to Question 24) 
B. 最後まで避難先にいた。（25.の質問へ進んでください） 
Stayed at the evacuation shelter all the time (Please turn to Question 25) 
C. 避難はしていない。（30.の質問へ進んでください） 
Did not evacuate (Please turn to Question 30) 
24. 避難先から自宅に一時的に戻った時刻と理由をご記入ください。 
24. Please indicate the time and reasons you went back home?  
A. 最初の避難先から 3 月  日 午前・午後   時頃 
                   （どちらかに○） 
From the first evacuation shelter       Day, March,         time (am, pm) 
その時、自宅に一時的に戻った理由を以下から選んでください（全てに○） 
Please indicate the reasons (Choose all matched) 
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1. もう津波は来ないと思ったから 2. 家の事が気になってきたから 
3. 石油コンビナート事故を気が付けなか
った 
4. もう石油コンビナート事故の危険がなか
ったから 
5. 避難場は不便だから（食べ物・水・ガス
がなかった等） 
6. 子供・老人・障がい者には特別の配慮が
必要だから 
7. 周囲の人が帰りはじめたから 8. 避難解除の情報を受けたから 
9. その他 (具体的に):                         
 
1. Tsunami may not come again 2.Worried about the house 
3. Did not notice the Natech accident 4. There was no danger for Natech accident 
anymore 
5. Inconvenient at current evacuation shelter (Short of 
food, water, gas, etc ) 
6. No special care for the old, children and/or the 
disables. 
7. People nearby begun to return 8. Received return message 
9. Others(Specify):                                                                       
 
B. 2 つ目の避難先から 3 月  日 午前・午後   時頃 
                 （どちらかに○） 
From the second evacuation shelter        Day, March,         time (am, pm) 
その時、自宅に一時的に戻った理由を以下から選んでください（全てに○） 
Please indicate the reasons (Choose all matched) 
1. もう津波は来ないと思ったから 2. 家の事が気になってきたから 
3. 石油コンビナート事故を気が付けなか
った 
4. もう石油コンビナート事故の危険がなか
ったから 
5. 避難場は不便だから（食べ物・水・ガス
がなかった等） 
6. 子供・老人・障がい者には特別の配慮が
必要だから 
7. 周囲の人が帰りはじめたから 8. 避難解除の情報を受けたから 
9. その他 (具体的に):                         
 
1. Tsunami may not come again 2.Worried about the house 
3. Did not notice the Natech accident 4. There was no danger for Natech accident 
anymore 
5. Inconvenient at current evacuation shelter (Short of 
food, water, gas, etc ) 
6. No special care for the old, children and/or the 
disables. 
7. People nearby begun to return 8. Received return message 
9. Others(Specify):                                                                       
 
C. 3 つ目の避難先から  ３月  日 午前・午後  時頃 
                    （どちらかに○） 
From the second evacuation shelter        Day, March,         time (am, pm) 
  その時、自宅に一時的に戻った理由を以下から選んでください（全てに○） 
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Please indicate the reasons (Choose all matched) 
1. もう津波は来ないと思ったから 2. 家の事が気になってきたから 
3. 石油コンビナート事故を気が付けなか
った 
4. もう石油コンビナート事故の危険がなか
ったから 
5. 避難場は不便だから（食べ物・水・ガス
がなかった等） 
6. 子供・老人・障がい者には特別の配慮が
必要だから 
7. 周囲の人が帰りはじめたから 8. 避難解除の情報を受けたから 
9. その他 (具体的に):                         
 
1. Tsunami may not come again 2.Worried about the house 
3. Did not notice the Natech accident 4. There was no danger for Natech accident 
anymore 
5. Inconvenient at current evacuation shelter (Short of 
food, water, gas, etc ) 
6. No special care for the old, children and/or the 
disables. 
7. People nearby begun to return 8. Received return message 
9. Others(Specify):                                                                       
 
D. 4 つ目の避難先から ３月  日 午前・午後  時頃 
                   （どちらかに○） 
From the second evacuation shelter        Day, March,         time (am, pm) 
その時、自宅に一時的に戻った理由を以下から選んでください（全てに○） 
Please indicate the reasons (Choose all matched) 
1. もう津波は来ないと思ったから 2. 家の事が気になってきたから 
3. 石油コンビナート事故を気が付けなか
った 
4. もう石油コンビナート事故の危険がなか
ったから 
5. 避難場は不便だから（食べ物・水・ガス
がなかった等） 
6. 子供・老人・障がい者には特別の配慮が
必要だから 
7. 周囲の人が帰りはじめたから 8. 避難解除の情報を受けたから 
9. その他 (具体的に):                         
 
1. Tsunami may not come again 2.Worried about the house 
3. Did not notice the Natech accident 4. There was no danger for Natech accident 
anymore 
5. Inconvenient at current evacuation shelter (Short of 
food, water, gas, etc ) 
6. No special care for the old, children and/or the 
disables. 
7. People nearby begun to return 8. Received return message 
9. Others(Specify):                                                                       
 
25. 帰宅する直前、石油コンビナート事故による影響について、どの程度と思いましたか [一つ
に○] 
25. Before deciding to go back home, to what extent did you think the Natech accident would affect 
your live or property?  
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A. 重大な災害 
To a very great extent 
B. やや重大な災害 
To a great extent 
C. 中程度の災害 
To some extent  
D. 小規模の災害 
To small extent 
E. その他（具体的に）                    
Others (please specify)                        
VII．石油コンビナート事故による避難解除について  
VII．Evacuation Cancel Message               
26. 避難解除を受けましたか。その日時をご記入ください。 
26. Did you receive the evacuation cancel message? Please indicate your receiving time.  
A. 受けた YES 
      2011 年 3月   日 午前・午後  時頃 
            （どちらかに○） 
                Day, March,         time (am, pm) 
B. 受けなかった    30.の質問へ進んでください。 
NO         Please turn to Question 30 
27. 避難解除を何で知りましたか [全てに○] 
27.  How did you receive the evacuation cancel message? [Choose all you used] 
A. 防災行政無線の戸別受信機 
Indoor receivers 
B. 防災行政無線の屋外スピーカー 
113 
 
  Loud speakers 
C. テレビ・ラジオ等 
        TV, and radio, etc 
D. 広報車 
Public-relation vehicles 
E. 役場職員・警察官から 
Local authorities (Staffs on scene, police) 
F. 家族から 
Family members 
G. 近隣から 
Neighbors 
H. 仕事関係者から 
        Colleagues 
I. その他 (具体的に):           
Others (Please specify):                
28. 避難解除の情報には次のことが含まれていましたか [全てに○] 
28. Were items listed below included in the evacuation cancel message? [Choose all included] 
A. 石油コンビナート区域の被害状況 
Damage situation of the industrial area 
B. 有害な物質の拡散状況 
         Hazardous materials Spread 
C. 健康についての説明 
Health influences 
D. 影響のある地域の範囲 
Affected area 
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E. 安全かどうかわからない地域の範囲 
Safety uncertainty areas 
F. 安全な地域の範囲 
Safety determined areas 
G. 帰宅途上の注意 
Matters need to attention during return  
H. その他 (具体的に):         
Others (Please specify):               
29. 避難解除の情報を受けた直後、石油コンビナート事故による自宅での影響は、どの程度
と思いましたか [一つに○] 
29. When you received the evacuation cancel message, to what extent did you think your living 
place was influenced by the Natech accident? 
A. まったく影響がないと思った 
Not at all  
B. あまり影響がないと思った 
To a small extent 
C. すこし影響があると思った 
To somewhat extent 
D. かなり影響があると思った 
To a great extent 
E. その他 (具体的に):            
Others (Specify):                      
VIII. 地震前のご自宅やご家族についてお伺いします 
VIII．Personal characteristics 
30. 当時、ご自宅は以下のうち、どれでしたか。 
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30.  Which of the following best describes the type of structure in which you live?  
A. 戸建て（持家）Detached house (owner) 
B. 戸建て（借家）Detached house (renter) 
C. マンション（分譲）Apartment (Condominium) 
D. マンション（賃貸）Apartment (renter) 
E. 木造アパート（賃貸）Wooden apartment (Rent) 
F. その他 Others（        ） 
31. 当時、ご自宅には、どのくらいの期間、居住されていましたか。 
31. Until the GEJET, how many years have you lived in that house?  
A. 1年未満  Less than 1 year 
B. 1 年以上 5 年未満 More than 1 year but less than 5 years 
C. 5 年以上 10年未満 More than 5 years but less than 10 years 
D. 10 年以上 20年未満 More than 10 years but less than 20 years 
E. 20 年以上 30年未満 More than 20 years but less than 30 years 
F. 30 年以上 40年未満 More than 30 years but less than 40 years 
G. 40 年以上 50年未満 More than 40 years but less than 50 years 
H. 50 年以上 More than 50 years 
32. あなたの性別について、お答えください 
32. Please indicate your gender 
A. 男 Male 
B. 女 Female 
33. あなたの年齢について、お答えください Please indicate your age 
          才 
34. あなたの職業をお答えください Please indicate your occupation.  
A. 農林水産業 Agriculture, forestry, and fishery  
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B. 自営業 Self-owned business 
C. 会社員・公務員 Office worker/ Civil servant 
D. 主婦 Housewife 
E. 学生 Student 
F. 無職 No job 
G. その他 Others  
35. あなたの家族の構成をお答えください  
35. Please indicate the number of your household members.  
A. 単身 Single 
B. 夫婦 Couple 
C. 2 世代 Two generations  
D. 3 世代 Three generations 
E. 4 世代 Four generations 
F. その他 (具体的に) Others (Specify)：          
 
36. 2011 年 3 月 11日の地震より前、災害からの避難経験がありましたか。  
36. Before the GEJET, did you have experience concerning earthquake, tsunami, or Natech accident? 
Please indicate the time of your experience.  
A. 地震 Earthquake       年 Year      月 Month 
B. 津波 Tsunami       年 Year      月Month 
C. 石油コンビナート事故 Natech accident      年 Year    月 Month 
D. その他(具体的に): Others (Specify):                    
E. なかった No 
37. 2011 年 3 月 11日の地震前に、石油コンビナート事故についての防災教育や訓練に参加
しましたか 
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37. Before the GEJET, did you take part in any workshop and/or training about industrial accident? 
A. はい YES 
B. いいえ NO 
38. ご自宅は地震後、引っ越しましたか。 
38. After the GEJET, did you move out?  
A. はい、引っ越した  YES 
B. いいえ、引っ越さなかった NO 
39. 引っ越した方は、元の住所をご記入ください(番地は不要です)。 
39. If you moved home, please indicate your old address.  
                                
（このアンケートは石油コンビナート地区の東/北東/西北/西方面 1km/1.5km/2km/2.5km以
内に配布） 
(This questionnaire is sending to the residents to east/northeast/northwest/east within 
1km/1-1.5km/1.5-2km/2km-2.5km of the industrial park) 
40. 最後に、今回のアンケートに関するご意見があれば、ご記入ください 
40.  At last, if you have any questions and/or recommendations to this questionnaire, please fill in 
the blank below. 
                                   
 
ご回答、ありがとうございました。同封の封筒で、ご返送お願い申し上げます。   
 
